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ABSTRACT 
 
The Chinese automotive industry was established 50 years ago with the technology 
transfer of a truck production system from the Soviet Union.  Since then, it developed 
into a decentralized and fragmented truck industry layout due to the self-reliant and 
defensive policies set forth by the central government.  Over the past two decades, 
China has obtained substantial and modern passenger car production systems with a 
large sum of foreign direct investment (FDI) and comprehensive technology transfer 
from global carmakers in Europe, the U.S., and Japan.  This research studies the 50-
year development history of the Chinese automotive industry and seeks to understand 
the role of the Chinese protectionist automotive industry policies and the impact of FDI 
and technology transfer.  China officially entered the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
in November 2001 and committed to end the 50 years of protectionism.  The WTO 
membership is expected to inject fierce market competition into the Chinese automotive 
industry and ultimately propel the industry to a new level.  My research attempts to 
forecast what might happen in the coming years.  
 
My research included site visits and personal interviews with seven senior executives 
from Chinese automotive firms located in Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangzhou, as well as 
three academic experts on the Chinese automotive industry at the Tsinghua University. 
 
This research finds that China has benefited significantly from foreign investment and 
technology transfers.  China was able to leapfrog from 1950s-level automotive 
production systems into 1990s-level advanced technologies, and the gap with world 
standards continues to narrow.  My research also indicates the protectionist automotive 
industry policies China had before the WTO accession have seriously hindered China’s 
ability to achieve the full potential impact that FDI could have made.  The lack of 
coherent policies between protection and competition has caused the Chinese 
automotive industry to remain fragmented and uncompetitive.  The lack of competition 
and restrictions on foreign equity has delayed the speed of technology transfers and 
China’s development of full automotive design and production capabilities.  China will 
stride in the post-WTO era. However, the protectionism, particular from regional and 
local governments, is likely to continue and hinder the full impact of benefits from the 
WTO membership.    
 
Thesis Supervisor: Michael A. Cusumano 
Title:   Sloan Management Review Professor of Management 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
The Year 2003 marks the 50th anniversary of the Chinese automotive industry, which 
was established with a direct technology transfer of a truck production system from what 
was then the Soviet Union in 1953.  Since then, the industry has been developed within 
a strong protectionist environment.  The first 30 years of the industry were primarily 
focused on truck production, with the result that China has developed into one of the 
largest truck producers in the world.  Over the past 20 years, China has seen a growing 
market demand for passenger cars and a rapid development in its car production sector.  
The development was primarily driven by Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and direct 
technology transfer from global carmakers.  Because of the protection, the overall 
development speed over the 50 years is fairly slow compared with the growth speeds of 
automotive industries from the U.S., Europe and Japan in their respective early 
development periods.  The Chinese automotive market has also been heavily protected 
with high tariffs and tight industrial policy, so that foreigners could not easily enter the 
market. 
 
China has a population of 1.3 billion people and extremely low private car ownership 
(lower than most countries in the world).  The Chinese automotive market by large still 
remains untapped, a key factor that has attracted huge foreign investments.  So far, the 
market has not yet fully materialized, since most Chinese residents still cannot afford to 
own a car.  However, the situation is changing, as the world has focused its attention on 
China and seen the country’s economy surge over the past 20 years.  Figure 1 
compares the top 10 largest Gross Domestic Production (GDP) and top 10 largest GDP 
by Purchase Power Parity (PPP), based on World Bank 2001 data.  The data indicate 
that China’s 2001 GDP reached USD1.16 trillion, making it the sixth largest economy in 
the world.  If measured with PPP, China reached USD5.11 trillion in 2001, surpassing 
France, UK, Germany, and Japan, which made it the world’s second largest economy. 
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Figure 1: Largest GDPs in the World in 2001 
 
World Largest GDP
$0
$1,000
$2,000
$3,000
$4,000
$5,000
$6,000
$7,000
$8,000
$9,000
$10,000
USA Japan Germany UK France China Italy Canada Mexico Spain 
U
SD
 B
ill
io
n
World Larget GDP by PPP
$0
$1,000
$2,000
$3,000
$4,000
$5,000
$6,000
$7,000
$8,000
$9,000
$10,000
USA China Japan India Germany Italy UK France Brazil Russian
U
SD
 B
ill
io
n
Source: World Bank Data, April 2003. 
 
A major motivation for this study is that the huge and heavily protected Chinese 
automotive market was suddenly opened to the world by China’s accession to the WTO 
in 2001.  The Chinese automotive market has become a focal point, attracting serious 
attention from the world business community, particularly the large global carmakers.  
China has become a new battlefield for carmakers as the 1.3 billion Chinese consumers 
began to buy cars.  This thesis studies, from a macro perspective, what has happened 
in China’s automotive sector and attempts to forecast what might happen in the near 
future over the next five to ten years. 
 
1.1 Characteristics of the Chinese Automotive Industry 
 
A Growing Industry 
Figure 2 indicates the automotive production in China from1988 to 2002 as collected by 
the Euromonitor Global Market Information Database.  Note that sales trends are similar, 
since most of Chinese made vehicles were for their domestic market, and only a small 
number of trucks were exported.  The figure indicates that China’s truck production had 
a slight dip around 1990 and has since enjoyed a stable growth.  China’s car production 
before 1990 was very small, but has grown rapidly since the early 1990s.  Most people 
believe the Chinese automotive industry will continue to grow significantly during the 
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coming years.  Michael Dunne, founder of Automotive Resources Asia, a consultancy 
with offices in Beijing, predicted that the Chinese automotive industry is likely to surpass 
the U.S. production by 2025, making China the largest vehicle producing country 
(Eisenstein, 2001).  
 
Figure 2: China’s Automotive Production, 1988 to 2002 
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The total production size of the industry today, although still small compared with that of 
more developed countries, has grown from almost zero 50 years ago to become the 
eighth largest in the world with annual automotive production of 2.4 million vehicles in 
2002.  Specifically, a report by the China Automotive Technology & Research Center 
(CATARC) indicated that China’s automotive industry sub-sector 2001 productions are 
ranked as follow: 1 
 
• Passenger car, 14th in the world 
• Passenger coach, 7th 
                                            
1 CATARC Report, November 12, 2002.  
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• Light truck, 2nd 
• Heavy truck, 3rd 
 
Table 1 lists the automotive production of the top 15 automotive producing countries 
and their respective average growth rates of domestic car markets over the past 10 
years.  The car market of China has grown 11.7% on average annually over the last 10 
years.  
 
Table 1: Top Automotive Producing Countries (2002) 
 
 
Rank 
 
Country 
 
Cars 
 
Commercial
 
Total 
Car Market  
10-Year Trend 
1 USA 5,294,280 8,081,350 13,375,630 0.3% 
2 Japan 7,995,000 1,613,000 9,608,000 -0.9% 
3 Germany 5,457,320 393,000 5,850,320 1.1% 
4 France 3,383,800 450,000 3,833,800 2.2% 
5 Canada 1,698,450 1,584,000 3,282,450 1.2% 
6 South Korea 2,309,000 436,000 2,745,000 -1.6% 
7 Spain 2,105,000 621,000 2,726,000 5.9% 
8 China 741,070 1,687,150 2,428,220 11.7% 
9 Mexico 1,258,460 540,800 1,799,260 8.4% 
10 Brazil 1,441,990 325,210 1,767,200 3.7% 
11 United Kingdom 1,401,000 201,000 1,602,000 4.3% 
12 Italy 1,250,000 311,000 1,561,000 3.2% 
13 Russia 998,460 308,660 1,307,120 1.4% 
14 India 717,040 164,250 881,290 14.6% 
15 Czech Republic 764,280 0 764,280 7.4% 
Production source: Euromonitor International Global Market Information Database, April 2003. 
Trend source: MEMA World Automotive Market Report, 2002-2003. 
 
Figure 3 compares China’s automotive production share over the world total from 1999 
to 2001.  As can be seen, China’s car production share increased from 1.47% in 1999 
to 1.84% in 2001, and their truck production share increased from 7.32% in 1999 to 
9.44% in 2001.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 11
Figure 3: China’s Automotive Production Share (% of World Total) 
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A Growing Market 
Figure 4 indicates the automotive market size (measured by total vehicles in use) in 
China from 1988 to 2002.  The chart indicates that China’s passenger car market has 
grown steadily since 1988 and experienced a significant increase around 2000.  This 
can be attributed to a combination of factors, including the changed government policy 
allowing for more private car ownership and the increase in the Chinese middle class, 
who earn enough money to afford a car.  The commercial market was flattened out 
during the 1990s, but resumed a significant growth trend since 1999.  
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Figure 4: Total Vehicles in Use in China 
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China’s current automotive market size for passenger cars is comparable to that of 
South Korea or Mexico.  But if one considers the 1.3 billion population of China, the 
Chinese automotive market is essentially untouched: on average, there is one car per 
322 persons in China, compared with one car per 18.4 persons in Mexico, 5.9 persons 
in South Korea, and 2.2 persons in the U.S.2  Most Chinese residents are still far from 
being able to afford to own a car.  The 2001 GDP per capita is only about USD890 while 
the average car costs USD20,000 or more.  Historically, the primary automotive buyers 
have been government agencies and taxi companies.   
 
China can be viewed as having two separate economies: the urban consumer economy 
with relatively higher disposable income, and the countryside survival economy with 
very low income.  Table 2 shows the GDP data of selected Chinese cities.  Clearly, the 
gap between the two economies is very wide and is getting wider.  
                                            
2 MEMA World Automotive Market Report, 2002-2003. 
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Table 2: Chinese GDP in Selected Areas 
City GDP 1988 GDP 1998 Growth % 
Beijing $781 $1,950 150% 
Shanghai $1,093 $3,043 178% 
Tianjin $634 $1,687 166% 
Guangdong $381 $1,339 251% 
Coastal $388 $1,282 230% 
Inland $205 $589 188% 
National Average $264 $811 207% 
Source: Robert Feenstra “China’s Entry to the WTO: A View from Automotive Industry,” 
Transportation Economics (Course ECN 145), University of California Davis, winter 2003. 
 
Researchers believe that a country’s automotive market will begin to develop when 
GDP per capita reached USD4,000 (Zoia, 2001).  There has been dramatic increase in 
private car ownership in recent years.  This indicates that China is no longer merely a 
potential automotive market; instead, the market has begun to materialize, particularly in 
the coastal areas of China.  Looking forward, the China Association of Automakers 
predicts that the car production in China will surpass 1 million units by 2005 and 2 
million units by 2010, as shown in Table 3.  
 
Table 3: Forecast of China’s demand for passenger (1,000 units) 
 2005 2010 2015 
Truck 1,060 – 1,200 1,410 – 1,530 1,670 – 1,780 
Bus 550 – 680 600 – 720 650 – 770 
Car 1,100 – 1,210 1,930 – 2,200 3,390 – 3550 
Total 2,710 – 3,090 3,940 – 4,450 5,710 – 6,100 
    Source: China Association of Automakers, 2002 
 
Figure 5 illustrates that the passenger car market in China grew on average about 7% 
per year from 1994 to 2000.  RolandBerger Strategy Consultants forecasted that the 
market will grow at 9% annually from 2000 to 2005 and 15% annually from 2005 to 
2010. 
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Figure 5: Forecast of the Chinese Automotive Market 
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 Source: RolandBerger Strategy Consultants, 2001 
 
China has about 300 million households.  Professor Zhenwei Qian of the Tsinghua 
University, who also serves as an advisor on China’s national policies on automotive 
industry, said that the Chinese government estimated that 8% of households would own 
a car by 2010, and 20% by 2020.3  The Far Eastern Economic Review (Murphy, 2003) 
reports that Volkswagen plans to boost worldwide sales by 20% to 6 million cars by 
2007, and expects half of that increase would come from China, underscoring the vital 
role of China’s growth to global carmakers when their traditional markets are flat. 
 
The passenger car market in China has a pyramid structure with five layers: 
 
• Governmental officials, 
• Large enterprises, 
• High income families and medium enterprises, 
• Middle income families and small firms, 
• Relatively lower income families who can afford to own a car. 
                                            
3 My interview with Professor Qian on December 19, 2002 
 15
The reason why Volkswagen’s Shanghai plant was so successful was because Santana 
cars could fit a wide scope of market demand.  Santana can function as taxis, vehicles 
for governmental officials, and vehicles for the newly emerging business elites.  
Chrysler never found or created a mass market for its high-platform vehicles. 
 
A Heavily Protected Industry 
The Chinese automotive industry is a backbone industry of the Chinese national 
economy and has played a major role in the development of China’s national economy 
and the improvement of people's living standards.  As such, the industry has been 
nurtured in a protectionist environment, more protected than other industries in China.  
Tariffs for imported automobiles and parts were set high, and there exist many other 
non-tariff barriers.  The Chinese central government is closely involved in the screening 
and approval of every company seeking to enter the automotive industry. 
 
In my opinion, it can be helpful to place an entry barrier to foreign competitors and 
provide certain period of protection for infant domestic automakers to explore 
economies of scale and grow.  However, an extended protection period could cause 
serious consequences.  Automakers in China, including foreign joint ventures (JVs), 
have been less motivated to innovate because of the lack of market competition under 
protection.  Because of the high tariffs for imported cars, they have been able to sell 
their products at a relatively high price and make profit even though their operations are 
inefficient and using less-advanced technologies.  The Chinese government has 
attempted to consolidate and restructure the fragmented automotive industry into a fully 
integrated and competitive industry, but they essentially failed because they could not or 
were unwilling to remove the protectionist environment quickly.  As a result, no real 
competition could be introduced.  All automakers in China are inefficient State-Owned 
Enterprises (SOEs), and the reforming process of improving the performance of SOEs 
has been very slow and complex due the social and political structure of China.  Today, 
the industry is still uncompetitive by world standards.  The cost of making cars in China 
is said to be higher than in Europe, the U.S., or Mexico (Murphy, 2003).  
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Foreign Direct Investment 
Over the past two decades, the Chinese automotive industry has attracted a large sum 
of FDI, USD20.9 billion by 1998 (Wang, 2001), primarily from Europe, the U.S., and 
Japan.  Almost all the global automakers have invested in China and established 
presence through forming JVs with Chinese automakers, particularly among the car 
production sector.  China’s automotive industry was predominantly a truck production 
industry by the mid-1980s.  The huge sum of FDI essentially injected a car production 
industry directly into China and completely changed the landscape of that industry.  A 
Mckinsey research study (Gao, 2002) indicates that, in 2000, 97% of cars were made 
by joint ventures, 2% were made by the First Auto Works, and 1% were made by 19 
others. 
 
WTO Membership 
In November 2001, China officially entered the WTO after 15 years of hard negotiations 
with existing WTO member countries.  Under pressure from the U.S., China made major 
concessions to its protections for many domestic industries.  Among many sectors 
affected by the WTO accession, the automotive industry seems one of the most open to 
a global challenge.  China agreed to phase out most of its automotive trade barriers in 
3-5 years and allow foreign firms to enter automotive distribution and sales, automotive 
related services (such as automotive insurance and financing), and after-sales services 
(warranty and parts).   Most significantly, the tariff for foreign made cars and 
components will be reduced from 80-100% to 25% by 2006.  Many believe that 
automotive prices in China will reduce significantly in coming years as more and more 
imported cars enter the competition. 
 
The WTO membership essentially pushed the unprepared industry into fierce 
competition with global players.  However, the positive side is that the WTO 
membership would inject much-needed market competition mechanisms into the 
industry and fundamentally boost the competitiveness of the industry.  It is widely 
believed that the WTO accession would put serious pressure on many inefficient 
Chinese automakers, and that many of them may not survive this process of change.  
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1.2 Questions to Be Addressed 
 
The first part of this thesis focuses on the development and changing dynamics of the 
Chinese automotive industry over last two decades.  China’s major protectionist policies 
are introduced and discussed.  The key question is how strategically and effectively has 
China used foreign investment and its own capital to develop the car production 
industry?  How successfully have foreign automakers used their opportunities to expand 
to the Chinese automotive market?  
 
The second part of my thesis looks issues associated with technology transfer. With the 
influx of FDI and the formation of Sino-foreign joint ventures, there has been large-scale 
and systematic technology transfer from global automakers to their respective Chinese 
partners.  China basically used the same truck production technologies obtained from 
Soviet Union for 30 years without major advancement.  The new waves of technology 
transfers have allowed China to leapfrog into 1970s-, 1980s- and 1990s-level 
automotive technologies.  The key question is how has China successfully leveraged 
their market power to obtain advanced technology?  To what extent have Chinese 
automakers been able to effectively absorb the technology?  What is China’s current 
capability in automotive development and production? 
 
The third part of this thesis focuses on the potential impact of WTO membership.  China 
will completely phase out its protection measures by 2006.  The key question is what 
kind of changes should China expect?  Many expect dramatic changes will occur, but 
some are skeptical. 
 
The thesis will attempt to answer the above questions based on my research and 
insights gained from my site visits in China and personal interviews of executives of the 
Chinese automotive industry.   
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CHAPTER 2 
DEVELOPMENT OF THE CHINESE AUTOMOTIVE INDUSTRY 
 
2.1 Early History and Formation of Fragmentation 
 
Pre-History 
The first automobiles were exported to China in 1901, primarily to Shanghai, the most 
industrialized city then in China.  By the middle of the 1920s, there were only 7,000 cars 
and 600 trucks, all imported, running around in major cities.  Most of them are owned by 
foreign residents living in China.  The development of automotive market in China was 
very slow because of the lack of paved roads and the low standards of living of most 
Chinese citizens (Harwit, 1995).  There were about 50,000 motorized vehicles of all 
sorts in the vast land and 24 motor repair factories located in eight big cities when the 
People’s Republic of China was established on October 1, 1949 (Xue, 1988).  Prior to 
that, there had been no significant automotive manufacturing capabilities in China. 
 
First Auto Works and Soviet Union Assistance 
Immediately after the founding of the new China, Chinese leaders began to build a 
domestic industrial foundation by acquiring complete manufacturing plants for steel, 
coal and electric power, and heavy machinery, primarily from the Soviet Union and 
Eastern Europe.  During the 1950s, 156 large industrial projects were built with direct 
assistance from the Soviet Union.  Among them are the FAW, located in Changchun, 
northeast China, and the Beijing Auto Works (BAW) (Harwit, 1987). 
 
July 15, 1953, the day China started to build FAW, marked the beginning of the Chinese 
automotive industry and the first instance of large-scale automotive technology transfer 
from foreign countries to China.  Everything from plant layouts, product designs, and 
production technology to management system was modeled after the practice at the 
Soviet “Zis” plant.  All machinery was imported from the Soviet Union and Eastern 
European countries.  FAW’s design capacity was 30,000 “Liberation” trucks a year.  The 
construction of FAW was complete in three years, due to full support from the Chinese 
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central government in terms of human, financial, and materials resources.  FAW began 
truck production in 1956 and produced 3,000 “Liberation” 4-ton Soviet Model Zis-150 
trucks in the next year.  The Liberation trucks had 81% Russian parts initially; the 
percentage went down to zero by 1965.  To accelerate the learning curve, hundreds of 
Chinese were sent to the Russia and trained in the Zis plant for a six months or a one-
year period.  At same time, many Russian experts were working at FAW offering 
technical assistance (Xue, 1988). 
 
FAW was highly vertically integrated due to the lack of a national industrial base.  The 
production of FAW reached 15,000 units in 1958, about equal to the 1953 production 
volume at Nissan and Toyota (Cusumano, 1985).  Looking back, the FAW was not very 
far behind the Japanese at that time.  Both Nissan and Toyota started their postwar 
transition from trucks to passenger cars.  The FAW, however, produced essentially the 
same truck for 30 years with very little development in production on passenger cars.  
The primary reason was because the country had high demand for trucks and utility 
vehicles for military and economy development, but had relatively small demand for 
passenger cars, since only high level government officials and diplomats needed cars.  
Ordinary residents were prohibited and could not afford to own a car. 
 
With the establishment of FAW, the Soviet Union essentially transferred a complete 
motor vehicle manufacturing system to China and thus helped China skip the early 
phase of world motor vehicle industry development, so that China directly entered the 
industrial production phase.  Following FAW, China continued to build the automotive 
industry by building more automobile manufacturing factories in other industrialized 
cities such as Beijing, Nanjing, and Shanghai.  All these factories also focused on trucks 
and utility vehicles.   
 
Major Policy Swing from Openness to Isolationism 
The Chinese government initially encouraged the industry to adopt foreign methods and 
experiences.  Besides the Russians, FAW also had early talks with the French on truck 
technology.  New automotive factories were primarily built in urban and industrialized 
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areas.  The relationship between China and the Soviet Union began deteriorating 
beginning in the late 1950s, and broke up in the early 1960s with the complete 
withdrawal of the Soviet experts.  Governmental policy on the automotive industry 
experienced major swings as Chinese leaders feared the susceptibility of foreign 
attacks of the country’s large-scale automotive plants in major cities.  From then on, 
new automotive factories built were small-scale and located in remote and mountainous 
areas to avoid possible foreign attacks.  In addition, China adopted a self-reliance policy 
and required all local governments to have a “small, but complete” industrial system in 
their own province.  As a result, small-scale factories proliferated widely all over the 
country as local governments competitively set up automotive plants in their regions 
(Harwit, 1995).  Small-scale factories could not leverage economics of scale, and 
therefore were inefficient. 
 
The policy swings following the break with the Soviet Union had serious detrimental 
impacts to the future development of the industry.  In fact, the Chinese government later 
has spent more than 20 years, still unsuccessfully, to undo the impact.  The result has 
been a highly fragmented domestic industry that produces low quality, low technology, 
though perhaps durable, automobiles. 
 
In 1964, the Chinese government approved the creation of the Second Auto Works 
(SAW), later renamed it to Dongfeng Motor Corporation (DFMC) in 1965, and began to 
build the second national large-scale automotive manufacturer in 1967.  DFMC was 
located in Shiyan, Hubei Province, also an isolated and mountainous region.  The 
DFMC was completely Chinese-built with technology and experiences learned from 
other domestic Chinese manufacturers.  This is a good example of domestic technology 
transfer within the Chinese automotive industry.  Nearly 98% of DFMC’s 20,000 pieces 
of equipment were made in China.  Many were newly developed, including many 
automatic production lines, also an indication of the progress made during its first two 
decades of the new China in the machine manufacturing industry (Xue, 1988). 
 
 
 21
Formation of Fragmentation 
Following the establishment of the DFMC, the number of small-scale factories continued 
to increase as China continued to build up its automotive industry.  Fixed asset 
investments in these small firms were very low.  Many of the small factories started out 
as automotive repair shops with old plants and equipment.  Many small firms 
established themselves first, and then pressed the central government to grant 
approvals.  Their products were outside the national automotive catalogue, but could 
still be commercialized under protected regional markets (Wang, 2001). 
 
Figure 6 shows the increase of China’s automotive and parts manufacturers from 1956 
to 2001.  The number of complete automakers in China soared from only 1 in 1956 to 
56 in 1980, then to 117 in 1990.   Since 1990, the number has been basically flat; it 
went up to 124 in 1992-1993, and decreased to 116 by 2001.  Consolidation occurred in 
the supplier industry from 1985: the total number of automotive suppliers reduced from 
an all time high of 2,366 in 1985 to 1,558 by 2001.  
 
Figure 6: Fragmentation of the Chinese Automotive Industry 
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        Source: Chinese Automotive Industry Yearbook 2002. 
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The problems associated with fragmentation were slowly felt in China and the 
government has begun to take actions to address this issue.  But this is no easy task.  
In 2002, only seven automakers produced more than 100,000 units; 25 produced more 
than 10,000 units; and the remaining 91 produced below 10,000 units (74 out of 91 
produced below 2,000 units). The average vehicle production size per factory is far 
below that of developed countries (see Table 4). 
 
Table 4: Comparison of Average Vehicle Production Size 
 
Plant Location 
Average vehicle 
production per plant 
North America 149,664 
Europe 119,110 
Japan/Korea 267,008 
S. America 61,198 
Emerging Markets 61,364 
      Source: Automotive Industry, February 2002 
 
 
2.2 Foreign Investment and Internal Protectionism 
 
Domestic Car Production and Boom of Imports 
By the middle of the 1980s, China basically had an infant passenger car industry and 
the relatively well-developed truck manufacturing sector.  Some trucks are exported to 
Asian and African countries, but they were not very competitive.  They are cheap but do 
not have very good quality.  China started to explore car production in FAW and 
Shanghai Automotive Industry Corporation (SAIC) in 1958.  Actual production was only 
about a few hundred a year, slowly increased to five thousand a year by 1980 (Harwit, 
1995).  There was no significant passenger car production until the early 1990s.  
 
In 1978, the Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping began economic reform and the “opening-
up” policy, which led rapid economic growth.  Demand for passenger cars has 
increased dramatically as more and more foreign tourists and business people came to 
China.  Because the automobile production in China was truck-oriented, the domestic 
industry could not meet the increasing demand for passenger cars, which resulted in 
explosions of imported of passenger cars in the mid- 1980s and again in the early 
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1990s.  Figure 7 shows the numbers of imported cars compared with domestic car 
production from 1981 to 2001.   
 
Figure 7: Passenger Car Imports vs. Domestic Production 
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However, the imported cars quickly depleted China’s foreign reserve, hard-earned from 
exports.  The China Automotive Industry Yearbook (2002) shows that from 1981 to 
2001, the country spent USD63 billion for automotive imports (USD48 billion for vehicles, 
USD15 billion for repair parts).  In 1993 alone, the country spent USD5.4 billion to 
import more than 310,000 vehicles, including 180,000 cars.  Taxi companies in 
particular thirsted for Japanese cars, such as Toyota Crowns and Nissan Bluebirds, 
because they have better quality and comfort than domestically made cars (Harwit, 
1995).   
 
By contrast, a CATARC report, released on November 12, 2002, indicates that the 
combined total domestic and foreign investment from 1981 to 2001 was only USD26 
billion, about one-third of what the country spent for automotive imports.  It clearly made 
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no sense to Chinese leaders to spend capital for importing cars rather than investing in 
domestic car production.  So, China tightened car imports and began to prompt Sino-
foreign joint ventures to increase its own domestic car production capacity.  In the 
meantime, global automakers also began to realize the potential of the vast Chinese 
automotive market and started to explore ways to enter the market.   
 
Emerging of Sino-foreign Joint Ventures 
The earliest two Sino-foreign ventures are Beijing Jeep Corporation, formed by the 
BAW and American Motor Corporation (AMC) (later acquired by Chrysler).  This joint 
venture started in 1984 with USD411 million total initial investment.  BAW contributed 
58% and AMC contributed 42% for an initial 20 year contract.  Two years later, 
Shanghai Volkswagen was formed between SAIC and German Volkswagen, with 
USD119 million total initial investment, split evenly between Volkswagen and Chinese 
side for an initial 25-year contract.  It is worthy noting that the Chinese government 
actively invited Japanese firms (Toyota and Nissan) to enter China and offered 
incentives to the Japanese.  But the Japanese at that time were focusing on their 
partnerships with American and European carmakers and declined the invitation.   
 
Following Chrysler and Volkswagen, more and more automakers began to invest in 
China’s automotive industry.  Fearing that they would lose control, the Chinese 
government did not allow wholly-owned operations by foreign automakers; foreign 
equity was not permitted to exceed 50%.  Some foreign investors prefer joint ventures 
for certain reasons, even despite the governmental pressure.  Joint ventures that 
include Chinese partners, necessary to help to understand the functioning of the local 
market and the business norms, are critical to accomplish goals successfully within the 
Chinese system and culture.   
 
Fifty years ago, China received a truck production industry through foreign investment 
and technology transfer from the Russians.  China again obtained a car production 
industry from Americans and Europeans, also through foreign investment and 
technology transfer.  FDI and JVs provided China with crucial opportunities to its 
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automotive industry to make great strides. Through technology transfer within JVs, the 
Chinese automotive industry imported many new technologies, including some core 
technologies for engine and transmission design and development.  China’s passenger 
car production steadily increased over the years, reaching 31% of the country’s entire 
vehicle production in 2002 and the Chinese automotive market grew 11.7% annually 
during the past ten years (Table 1).  
 
Infant Industry Status and Protectionist Environment 
In 1987, the government officially set the automotive industry as a pillar industry and 
entitled it with favorable governmental policies.  During the entire 50 year history, the 
industry was deemed by central government to be a weak industry which needed strong 
protection from foreign competition.  Almost all automakers in China are SOEs which 
are known to be inefficient and uncompetitive.  Under high tariff protection, many SOEs 
were able to survive, even be profitable, without efficiency or economics of scale.  
Because of the protection, foreign joint ventures also lacked any motivation to innovate.  
For example, Shanghai Volkswagen was able to sell an outdated a 70s model, the 
Santana, for 15 years without significant technologically innovation.  There were few 
private enterprises capable of making cars before the late 1990s since the government 
basically did not permit private enterprises to enter automotive manufacturing.  In the 
late 1990s, some new private entrants began to emerge but were challenged by 
shortages of capital.   
 
In summary, after 50 years of development, the Chinese automotive industry is still in its 
infant stage, far behind the European, American, and Japanese automotive industries.  
In November 2001, China entered a new era by officially committing itself to the WTO 
rules.  The most significant aspect of the WTO membership is that it will bring market 
competition and profound challenges to the industry.  Some believe that the domestic 
automotive industry will be crushed by global competition, and many believe the 
industry will survive and pose major threat to global automakers.  I tend to agree with 
the latter opinion. 
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CHAPTER 3 
CHINA’S PROTECTIONIST POLICIES 
 
Ever since the beginning, the Chinese government has played a vital role in every step 
of the development of the industry and is heavily involved in micromanaging the industry, 
including planning and approval of each automotive manufacturing factory (both 
domestic and joint venture).  To understand the impact created by foreign investment 
and technology transfer, it is necessary to first understand the protectionist policies 
implemented by the Chinese government over the years.   
 
3.1 Pillar Industry Policy 
 
The first important governmental policy on automotive industry is China’s official 
designation of automotive industry as a pillar industry.  The Chinese government has 
long realized the enormous strategic and economic necessity of a well-developed 
automotive industry.  To streamline government leverage and better allocate resources 
to the development of key industries, in 1987, the Chinese government officially 
designated several industrial sectors as “pillar” industries, a label that confers the 
benefits of increased government funding and assistance.  The pillar industry policies 
were reinforced in 1994 and 1999.  Pillar industries include machinery, electronics, 
petrochemicals, automobiles and construction materials.  These industries would be 
developed with strong state support and would provide primary engines for continued 
economic growth in China.  For example, the central government funded more than 
USD60 billion through the year 2000 to promote domestic capabilities in these 
industries (BXA, 1998).  As pillar industries, these industries receive favorable 
government support including easier access to capital and priority approval in forming 
joint ventures and building research and development centers.  For key manufacturers, 
the government also reduces their debt burden by swapping debt for equity and 
optimizing their capital structure.   
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Figure 8: Main Materials Used for Automobile Production 
 
Source: China Automotive Technology & Research Center, November 12, 2002. 
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The automotive industry is a comprehensive industry and a gigantic system engineering 
of social economy.  A typical car has over 15,000 components.  To produce a quality 
car takes competency in design, engineering, manufacturing, and assembly of all 
15,000 components.  The quality of cars has been viewed as a yardstick of 
industrialization and a measurement of overall economic strength of a country.  
Research indicates that development of automotive industry would help modernize over 
100 sub-industries, both downstream and upstream (Wang, 2003).  So, the growth of 
the automotive industry will give impetus to the development of the related industries 
and vice versa.  The figure shows how car production relates to other industries, which 
to some extent, reflects the Chinese government’s view on the automotive industry. 
 
The pillar policy has given the Chinese automotive industry strong support and attention 
from the central government to effectively attract FDI.  The fact that the industry has 
successfully attracted almost all global automakers to invest in China over the past 15-
20 years confirms that the pillar industry policy has achieved, at least partially, what it 
intended to achieve.   The Chinese government has been working closely with the 
automotive industry in contacting, negotiating with, and selecting foreign partners for 
Chinese firms.  The government has provided extensive resources to help the industry 
grow. 
 
3.2 Automotive Industry Policy 
 
The Chinese automotive industry grew under defensive and self-reliance policies which 
had resulted a largely fragmented and decentralized industry layout.  Small-scale 
productions were spread around all of China and had no economies of scale.  Starting 
in the early 1990s, more and more foreign investors became interested in the industry.  
To consolidate and protect the industry and effectively manage FDI, the State Planning 
Commission (SPC) issued the “Industrial Policy for the Automobile Industry” on 
February 19, 1994.  This major governmental policy allowed government to impose 
more leverage and control on the development of the industry and direct FDI to projects 
China deemed critical.  The approach was modeled on that of Korean industrial 
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development in the 1970s when the Korean government urgently sought to attract 
foreign funds, technology, and management to boost its greatly lagging Korean 
automotive industry (Wang, 2001).  The policy is often referred as China’s “Automotive 
Industry Policy” and provided a legal foundation to allow the government to better 
navigate the industry out of its situation. 
 
Industry Development Control 
The Automotive Industry Policy established a list of product categories that government 
deemed important and marked them with high priority for development.  A system was 
introduced whereby automotive enterprises had to apply for the authentication of their 
products before they could sell them to market.  Once authenticated, specific vehicle 
models are entered into a nationwide catalogue which is used by public security 
bureaus to issue licenses for motor vehicles (Nee, 2002).  Through the product 
development control, the government guides the industry to focus on certain product 
mixes deemed critical by the central government, preventing automotive enterprises 
from developing other things less desired by the government.   
 
FDI Screening and Approval 
The Automotive Industry Policy intended to attract those foreign investors that the 
government deemed appropriate.  The policy required that all foreign investments in the 
automotive field must be approved by the central government.  The central government 
would only approve those programs that conformed to the policy.  Chinese domestic 
automakers were directed to look for foreign firms that have: 
 
• product patents and trademarks,  
• product development and manufacturing technology,  
• independent international sales and distributions, and 
• strong financial capabilities. 
 
When forming joint ventures, the policy requires that joint ventures:  
• set up a research and development arm,  
• produce products meeting international technical standards,  
• be able to balance their foreign exchange independently, 
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• provide preferential status for domestic parts and components, and  
• have at least 50% of the venture’s equity from the Chinese side. 
 
The goal of FDI screening and approval is to select those global firms that truly are 
competitive players with strong technology and financial capabilities.  The FDI control 
effectively prevents undesired foreign firms from entering the Chinese market.  The 
policy also requires foreign firms to transfer technology to joint ventures for product 
development (not just assembling in China) and must export China-made products.  
The fact that China was able to successfully implement these measures indicates that 
China is a buyer’s market and the Chinese government has been able effectively 
leverage their market power to select the best investors.  Many foreign investors are 
somewhat blind about the potential of the Chinese market.  Some think as long as they 
have a presence in China, they would be able to sell products to the mass Chinese 
market. 
 
Import Control and Export Incentive 
The Automotive Industry Policy controls automotive imports and encourages exports.  
Imports tariffs were kept very high (over 100% for most foreign made cars and 
components) and only four seaports (Dalian, Tianjin, Shanghai, and Huangpu) were 
permitted to import complete vehicles.  This centralized import control to ensure that the 
numbers of imported vehicles were within planned quotas.  Imported vehicles must pay 
customs duties, except for diplomatic vehicles.  All imported vehicles must be inspected 
for quality, with each vehicle issued an “Inspection and Quarantine Certificate for 
Entering Commodities” as well as a “Car Attaching Inspection Certificate.” This latter 
document accompanies the car throughout the distribution process in China and must 
be used to register the car for a license in its city of use (Nee, 2002). 
 
The policy also established a localization requirement for automotive joint ventures 
whereby the tariffs on imported parts and components were determined by the 
percentage of the total value of locally made items over the car’s final value. The higher 
the percentage of local content value, the lower the tariff would be. Table 5 shows the 
tariff rates based on the percentage of local content: 
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Table 5: Local Content and Import Tariff 
 
Local content 
Tariff for imported 
components 
Above 80% 40% 
60-80% 60% 
Below 60% 75% 
  Source: Import Vehicle Market Handbook, Beijing Transportation Press 1997 
 
Implementation of the Automotive Industry Policy 
Unlike in developed countries where such industry policy would be constituted into law 
or formal regulations, in China, the policy was implemented as an internal domestic 
policy, primarily due to the central planning and controlling nature of China’s political 
system.  However, even though this was just an internal process instead of law, it was 
implemented very effectively and successfully because of the central approval 
authorities.  It was implemented by a series of notices from relevant departments such 
as the State Administration of Taxation, and the General Administration of Customs.  
Because of the policy is internal, foreigners often are not fully aware of their 
ramifications and must reply upon their Chinese partners.  For example, when General 
Motors was negotiating its Shanghai project, there was no written information available 
on how the Chinese Customs would apply the localization rules on tariffs for imported 
automotive parts.  The only source of information available was the Chinese partner 
SAIC, which had experience in dealing with the system and was probably involved in 
China’s policy-making process as well (Nee, 2002). 
 
In preparation for entry into the WTO, China has gradually formalized some of these 
previously internal measures included in the Automotive Industry Policy.  In 1997, a 
formal regulation was issued which centralized control of the automotive projects 
approval process.  The published regulation formally required that the SPC and State 
Economic and Trade Commission (SETC) must approve all automotive projects 
regardless of the source of funding, the amount of funding, the type of construction 
involved, or the type of assembled product (Nee, 2002).  Later in 1997, China issued 
regulations formalizing the taxation based on local content for domestically produced 
vehicles.  Clearly, China did not plan to give up these controls in the WTO negotiations.  
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However, these newly created regulations became obsolete and were overridden by the 
WTO Agreements in November 2001. 
 
3.3 China’s 10th Five-Year Plan 
 
The most recent and important governmental policy is China’s 10th Five-Year Plan 
(FYP), released to the public in June 2001.  China uses a five-year planning system for 
most major economic development and resource allocations.   The 10th FYP serves as 
the master plan for economic planning and development for 2001 to 2005.   
 
Background of the 10th FYP 
The Automotive Industry Policy, implemented since 1994, has effectively allowed the 
government to control product development and foreign investment in China.  The 
Chinese government has paired their large-scale domestic automotive manufacturers 
with global automakers.  In some cases, global automakers competed for certain 
Chinese partners and final decisions usually were made by the central government 
(similar to arranged marriages). 
 
However, the landscape of the industry was still largely fragmented and decentralized.  
The total number of whole vehicle manufacturers remained around 120 (with a slight 
drop to 116 by 2001).  Governmental goals of consolidation and restructuring largely 
failed.  There are two possible explanations.  First, the industry has been treated as an 
infant industry and received high-tariff protection from foreign competition.  Because of 
the protection, automobile prices in China were much higher than outside free-market 
prices.  Many Original Equipment Manufactures (OEMs), although inefficient and 
uncompetitive, were able to make enough profit to survive.  The Chinese Automotive 
Industry Yearbook 2002 reports that about 65-70% of enterprises across the automotive 
industry (including OEMs and suppliers) were profitable in 2001.   Clearly, that 
percentage would be expected to decrease in the post-WTO era.  Second, the reason 
why the 30-35% of enterprises that remain could stay in business, not be bankrupted, is 
because most of them are SOEs and are subsidized by the central government and/or 
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regional and local governments to avoid bankruptcy and massive layoffs.  As China 
proceeded in its WTO negotiations, government officials may have realized they would 
lose their leverage by China’s accession to WTO.  Also the industry would not have 
sufficient time to grow stronger before facing competition from global players.  Hence, a 
rushed and ambitious consolidation plan was included in the 10th FYP. 
 
Objectives of the 10th FYP 
In June 2001, China released the 10th Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social 
Development4 where all government units across China set forth specific administrative 
industrial and development plans for the years 2001-2005.  The FYP specifically called 
for governmental efforts to streamline the automotive industry by consolidating or 
eliminating small and unprofitable firms to form a few large and strong players.  The 
SETC issued the FYP report with the following ambitious goals set for organizational 
and restructuring of its automotive sector: 
 
“The establishment of two to three large internationally competitive automotive 
enterprise groups by 2005.  These large enterprise groups will have over 70% of 
market share.  Sales and after-sales service systems will be in conformity with 
international practice.  Five to ten large automotive parts enterprise groups will 
be built and top three producers of key parts will have over 70% of the domestic 
market share.  Parts exports should account for 20% of these companies’ total 
sales.  Three to four motorcycle enterprise groups with strong international 
competitiveness will be established as well.”5 
 
Along with the 10th FYP, relevant government agencies published policies and 
measures to inject competition, restructuring and technical innovation into the 
automotive industry (Wang 2003).  The 10th FYP marks the first time that China laid out 
a blueprint for industry consolidation that has broad implications for both domestic 
enterprises and joint ventures with foreign firms.  Under the plan, more than 100 small 
                                            
4 Original Chinese text of the 10th FYP was published at The People’s Daily on June 26, 2001.   
5 As translated by Owen D. Nee of Goudert Brothers LLP. 
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automotive firms in China would be closed or merged into existing three largest 
automotive groups: SAIC Group, FAW Group and DFAC Group.  These three groups 
and their joint ventures will constitute 70% or more market share of the country’s 
production.  The 10th FYP projects that China’s total automotive output will increase 
significantly in the five-year period.  The total output by 2005 is forecasted to be about 
3.2 million units, including 1.1 million passenger cars.   
 
With the 10th FYP, China is trying to solve the historical automotive industry problems 
by forcefully grouping those domestic automakers deemed hopeful together, and 
closing those deemed hopeless.  The industry has been under protection for 50 years 
but still is not mature.  It is not clear if Chinese leaders had realized that the lack of 
competition under the strong government protection was causing the problems.  It is 
doubtful if China would be able to achieve the objectives within the five-year term (2001-
2005) given the strong regional protection to their local industries.  Thanks to the WTO 
membership, the consolidation process has definitely been placed on a fast track as 
real market forces enter the system.  
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CHAPTER 4 
STATUS OF THE CHINESE AUTOMOTIVE INDUSTRY BEFORE WTO ACCESSION 
 
Although the automotive industry has made remarkable developments in recent years, it 
is still has low productivity, small production size, and an inefficient structure.  This 
chapter provides information and data illustrating the current status of China’s 
automotive industry, before the full impact of WTO membership is felt. 
 
4.1 Domestic Car Production 
China has developed capabilities of producing series of automobiles in large batches, 
including heavy- and medium-duty trucks, light vehicles, mini-buses, cars, coaches, and 
motor vehicles for special purposes.  Among them, the car segment has had the most 
significant recent development.  Table 6 lists the major car assembly projects in China 
in 2002 and their respective products and capacity.   
 
Table 6: Major Car Assembly Projects in China 2002 
 
Company 
Foreign 
Partner(s) 
 
Products Capacity
FAW-Volkswagen Automotive Co. Volkswagen Jetta, Bora, Audi 200,000
PSA ZX/Fookang, Picasso 150,000Dongfeng Motor Corp. 
  Nissan Fengshen (Bluebird) 30,000
Volkswagen Santana, Passat, Polo 450,000Shanghai Automotive Industry Corp 
  General Motors Buick Century, Sail 150,000
Daihatsu Charade 150,000Tianjin Automotive Industrial Co. 
  Toyota NBCV 30,000
Guangzhou Honda Automobile Co. Honda Accord, Odyssey 75,000
Suzuki Alto, Swift 150,000Chang'an Automobile Co. 
  Ford Motor Fiesta/Ikon 30,000
Geely Group -- Haoqing, Merrie, Ulio 200,000
SAIC-Qirui Automobile Co. -- Chery 50,000
Guizhou Aviation Industry Fuji Heavy Skylark 50,000
Fiat Palio 30,000Yuejin Auto Group Corp. 
  -- Eagle/Unique 30,000
FAW Hainan Motor Co. Mazda 323/Premacy 50,000
Jiangsu Yueda Group Co. Hyundai/Kia Pride 30,000
Brilliance China Automotive Holding -- Zhonghua 30,000
Shanghai JMStar Group -- Meilu 30,000
Hafei Auto Manufacturing Co. -- Baili, Saima 30,000
Jiangxi Changhe Suzuki Automobile Suzuki Beidouxing (WagonR) 30,000
Xian Qinchuan Automotive Co. -- Flyer 30,000
      Source: China Association of Automakers, China Business Update, 2002.  
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The table above shows that the total car production capacity has exceeded 2 million 
units overall.  But China’s actual car production in 2002 was only 741,000 units, below 
40% of its capacity.  In China, both over-capacity and high demand of vehicles co-exist, 
which indicates a mismatch between market demands and what the industry can deliver.  
So far, the industry, as directed by government, has focused on passenger car models 
for institutional purchases, while at the same time market demand for private consumers 
has soared.  For example, Dongfeng Citroen had the capacity of 150,000 units per year 
but their output was only 85,000 units in 2002.  This problem affects almost every joint 
venture.  The root of this problem is the lack of the right product for the market’s needs, 
compared to product economies of scale.  Most of the automobiles and passenger cars 
defined by the government are still beyond the means of the average consumers in 
China.  The overcapacity issue is getting worse as reported by the RolandBerger 
Strategy Consultants that although the average capacity utilization was below 50%, an 
additional extension of 400,000 units were planned for the next 5 years (Xu, 2001). 
 
Figure 9: Location and Capacity of Major Joint Venture 2001 
 
Source: RolandBerger Strategy Consultants, 2001 
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Figure 9 shows the location of major car production joint ventures and their respective 
founding year and production capacity in 2001.  Comparing the capacity information 
reported in Table 6 and on Figure 9, it shows that production capacity in all SAIC, FAW, 
and DFAC increased from 2001 to 2002.   
 
Level of Fragmentation 
The industry layout remains largely fragmented despite aggressive efforts from the 
central government.  The number of whole vehicle manufacturers remains as high as 
116 by 2001.  Table 7 lists the top 10 automotive manufacturers in China and their 
market share in 2002.  The combined market share of the top 10 firms is about 85%, 
which means the remaining 106 firms have only 15% of total market share.  There are 
still many small-scale manufacturers with annual production below 1,000 units.   
 
Table 7:  Top 10 Automotive Manufacturers and Market Share, 2002 
 
Top 10 Chinese automotive manufacturers 
2002  
Total Auto Sales 
2002  
Market Share 
Shanghai Auto Industry Corporation 610,157 18.9% 
FAW Group Corp. 565,493 17.9% 
Dongfeng Motor Corp. 415,714 13.3% 
Chana Automobile Liability Co., Ltd. 307,578 10.5% 
Beijing Automotive Industry Group Co. 180,531 5.8% 
Harbin Hafei Automotive Co., Ltd. 175,055 5.5% 
Changhe Aircraft Industries Co., Ltd 150,198 4.9% 
Tianjin Automotive Industry Co., Ltd 101,799 3.0% 
Jinbei Auto Holding Co., Ltd. 84,483 2.7% 
Nanjing Auto Co., Ltd. 83,538 2.7% 
 Source: China Automotive Technology & Research Center, 2003. 
 
Focusing on the top 7 firms, Figure 10 illustrates the industry fragmentation, by 
comparing revenue data of the top seven firms with the industry average revenue 
(USD280 million). 
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Figure 10: Revenue of Major Automakers 2001 
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 Source: Chinese Automotive Industry Yearbook 2002. 
 
In his recently published book Selling China: Foreign Direct Investment during the 
Reform Era, Professor of Yasheng Huang of the Harvard Business School studied the 
fragmentation of the Chinese auto industry by comparing the industry concentration 
levels of the automotive industries of Brazil, Japan, and Korea during similar 
development periods.  Table 8 indicates the four country comparison of industry 
concentration level of the top one firm, top two firms, and top three firms.  The data 
reveal that China’s industry concentration level has been lower than that of other three 
countries.  The top three firms in Brazil and Korea were able to achieve a very high level 
of oligopoly (90+% market shares).  Similarly in Japan, the top three firms were able to 
control 72.8% market.  However, in China, the top three firms only accounted for about 
one-third of the market.  The situation has been improved lately, with the top three firms 
accounting for 50% of the total market in 2002.  There are simply too many auto players 
in China which have dragged the whole industry down, from developing into fully 
integrated, large-scale, efficient operations.  
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Table 8: Concentration Ratios of the Automotive Industry (%) 
  One-Firm ratio Two-Firm ratio Three-firm ratio Market size (million 
units) 
Brazil 1959 24.8 42.7 60.6 0.42 
 1970 56.1 74.3 91.2  
Japan 1960 32.1 56.1 65.1 0.41 
 1975 33.7 63.6 72.8 6.94 
Korea 1975 54.6 77.7 96.4  
 1986 71.3 88.6 97.9 0.97 
China 1985 19.2 38.0 43.0  
 1992 13.1 26.0 32.1 1.07 
 1995 12.6 23.6 33.3 1.28 
 1998 14.7 25.4 34.4 1.60 
 2002 18.9 36.8 50.1 3.12 
Source: Yasheng Huang, Selling China: Foreign Direct Investment during the Reform Era, 2003. 
 
4.2 China’s “Big Three” 
 
The Tenth Five-Year Plan of China’s automotive industry presents a consolidation plan 
whereby the Chinese government was determined to shake up the industry and 
restructure them into three large-scale groups that will at least have 70% market share.  
The ultimate goal is to create a Chinese version of the “Big Three” American automobile 
makers.  Table 9 lists the top three automotive players in China and their market share 
in total automotive production and car production (including production from joint 
ventures).  The data show that the Big Three have 50% overall market share and 78% 
car production share.  The high concentration levels enjoyed in car production industry 
could be attributed to the dominance of a few global players.  Significantly, Volkswagen 
alone takes more than 50% of the market, by partnering with 2 of the Chinese Big Three 
automakers. 
Table 9: Top 3 market share 2002 
 Total Car 
SAIC Group (JVs with VW and GM) 18.9% 38.3% 
FAW Group (JV with VW) 17.9% 29.0% 
DFMC Group (JV with Citroen) 13.3% 11.7% 
Top 3 Total 50% 78% 
   Source: China Automotive Technology & Research Center, 2003. 
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The Chinese government will no doubt give the Big Three considerable advantages on 
both policies and resources to allow them to expand and take over small firms.  Many 
current small automakers will be either closed or integrated into the Big Three.  
 
Table 10 gives a snapshot of the makeup of the Big Three’s car production by the end 
of 2002.  As industry consolidation and re-organization continues, the compositions of 
the Big Three are likely to change over time.   
 
Table 10: The Big Three of China’s Car Industry 
Group/ Car maker Location (city) Description 2002  market share 
FAW Group Changchun  29.0% 
FAW VW Changchun  A joint venture between VW and FAW which holds 60 % of shares 17.9% 
FAW Xiali Tianjin FAW has held 51 % of shares since June 2002  8.2% 
Tianjing Toyota  Tianjin FAW Xiali (holding 50 % of shares of Tianjin Toyota) 0% 
FAW Cars Changchun Listed company of FAW  
FAW Hainan Auto Co. Haikou Wholly owned subsidiary company of FAW  2.9% 
DFAC Group Shiyan, Hubei  11.7% 
Dongfeng Citroen Auto  Wuhan Dongfeng holds 32% 7.0% 
Fengshen Auto Guangzhou  Dongfeng holds 60%  3.2% 
Dongfeng Yueda Kia Yancheng, Jiangsu Dongfeng holds 25%  1.5% 
Dongfeng Nissan Wuhan Dongfeng may hold up to 50 % 0% 
SAIC Group Shanghai  38.3% 
VW Shanghai Shanghai SAIC holds 25 % of shares 24.7% 
GM Shanghai Shanghai SAIC holds 50% of shares 9.5% 
Chery SAIC Wuhu, Anhui SAIC holds 20 % of shares but is not involved in management  4.2% 
Yantai GM Daewoo Project Yantai, Shandong Would- be venture with GM Shanghai 0% 
Source: China Automotive Technology & Research Center, 2003. 
 
The table reveals that the organizational structure of the Big Three is quite complex, 
and would be even more complex if commercial vehicle production is added into the 
table.  All of them are geographically spread around China, with FAW group 
encompassing the widest geographical distance, from their most northern city of 
Changchun to their most southern city of Haikou.  Different equity holding, partnership, 
and management formats were employed, and all three are involved with multiple 
foreign partners.  No public information was found to show how the big groups were 
formed and what kind of synergies could be developed from subsidiaries within each 
group.  It is difficult to predict how well the Big Three will evolve over the coming years; 
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however, judging from their organizational structures, they are bound to face 
tremendous challenges. 
 
4.3 Industry Profiles 
 
2001 Industry Profile 
 
Table 11: Chinese Automotive Industry in 2001 
  
Number 
of Firm 
% of 
Unprofitable 
Firm 
 
Total Industry 
Revenue ($M) 
Average 
Revenue Per 
Firm ($M) 
Average 
R&D 
Expense 
Whole vehicle 116 31.0% 32,469 280 1.3% 
Retrofitter 525 37.7% 4,487 9 1.2% 
Motorcycle makers 148 36.5% 8,711 59 0.5% 
Engine makers 54 35.2% 1,276 24 1.2% 
Suppliers 1558 28.4% 11,606 7 1.6% 
   Source: Chinese Automotive Industry Yearbook 2002 
 
Table 11 lists the industry profiles of the Chinese automotive industry in 2001.  
Compared with developed countries, the size of the industry is quite small.  The 
combined revenue of all 116 automotive manufacturers is only about USD32 billion, 
which is about one-sixth of that of General Motors.  The striking characteristics are that 
about 30% of firms are unprofitable across the industry, and the average size of firms is 
extremely low, indications of diseconomy of scale.  It is reported that components made 
in China cost 10-20% higher than world standards despite the cheaper labor costs in 
China (Murphy, 2003).  Given the average revenue of USD7 million, it is easy to 
conclude diseconomy of scale is a major factor for the high supplier costs.  The table 
also illustrates that R&D expense is low across the industry, ranging from 0.5% to 1.6%.  
 
2001 Joint Venture Profile 
 
Table 12: Profile of Joint Ventures and Foreign Wholly-Owned Firms 2001 
 Number 
of 
Firms 
% of 
Unprofitable 
Firm 
Total 
Revenue 
($M) 
Average 
Revenue per 
Firm ($M) 
 
R&D 
Expense 
Whole vehicle JVs 21 23.8% 11,720 558 1.4% 
Retrofitter JVs 20 25.0% 169 8 0.7% 
Motorcycle maker JVs 10 50.0% 703 70 0.2% 
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Engine maker JVs 9 22.2% 257 29 0.1% 
Suppliers JVs 148 21.6% 3,172 21 2.2% 
JV Total 208 23.6% 16,020 77 1.5% 
Engine makers wholly-owned 1 0.0% 62 62 0.2% 
Suppliers wholly-owned 20 0.0% 589 29 0.8% 
Wholly-owned total 21 0.0% 650 31 0.8% 
Source: Chinese Automotive Industry Yearbook 2002. 
 
Table 12 illustrates the profile of Sino-foreign joint ventures and foreign wholly-owned 
firms in China’s automotive industry.  China does not yet allow wholly-owned foreign 
operations in vehicle assembly and manufacture of major components, except for 
certain less important parts.  Comparing the two tables above, it can be seen that the 
total revenue of joint ventures makes up about one-third of that of the entire industry.  In 
general, the average firm size joint venture is bigger than industry average, but it is still 
small to reach any sensible scale of economy. 
 
A clear and distinct point the table reveals is that 23.6% of the joint ventures lost money 
in 2001, while 100% of wholly-owned firms were profitable.  This suggests that wholly-
owned firms are operated in a more efficient manner.  In addition, any continued lack of 
profitability of these JVs would require re-evaluation of the firm’s strategy.  The table 
also reveals that average revenue of joint ventures and wholly-owned firms is fairly 
small and that very little was spent on R&D. 
 
Although foreign carmakers do not have majority ownership, they have tremendous 
discretion on the operation of joint ventures because they hold the intellectual property 
rights and technology.  Over the years, the Chinese government also loosened up some 
policies which would allow foreign partners to impose more influence over the 
management of joint ventures.  For example, Citroen, which holds 25% in Dongfeng 
Citroen, controls important management activities such as sales, purchasing, finances, 
as well as technology transfer, production control, and quality control. Similar situations 
can be found in many other automotive joint ventures in China. 
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Product Quality and Cost 
With the high local content requirement and the generally poor industrial manufacturing 
capabilities China has had, the product quality and cost are of great concern to many 
foreign carmakers.  Their JV products have lower quality but higher cost, compared with 
world standards, particularly because of their parts cost is higher. 
 
So why are automotive parts costly while China provides the cheapest labor, and prices 
for goods are generally falling across all markets in China?  One explanation is that 
each of the 116 automakers in China has its own, exclusive suppliers, which goes back 
to this same issue of fragmentation and diseconomy of scale.  Furthermore, under 
national and regional protections, suppliers tend to be locked into contracts to supply a 
single automaker, giving them a virtual monopoly on that business, and therefore are 
able to charge what they like for components (Access Asia, 2003). 
 
Under WTO rules, many small-scale suppliers are expected to be pushed out or 
absorbed into bigger suppliers.  With strong market competition and pressure from 
government, the industry is unavoidably heading to mass integration and consolidation 
during the coming years.  Even though Chinese suppliers are not as competitive as 
global automotive suppliers, most global companies realize that a strong local supplier 
base is needed for long term competitiveness on both cost and quality.  At least local 
suppliers should have lower freight costs and faster supply. 
 
In summary, China has successfully established a few large-scale automotive 
manufacturers with sizeable operations.  The Chinese version of the Big Three 
automakers began to emerge as the Chinese government aggressively pushed for 
industry consolidation and restructure.  However, the size of the industry is still small 
and the industry is by and large very fragmented and without economies of scale.   
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CHAPTER 5 
FOREIGN INVESTMENT 
 
China started its economic reforms and opening-up policy in 1978.  Chinese leaders 
quickly realized that China seriously lacked financial resources and they had to rely on 
foreign capital for the economic development.  Before 1991, China was able to attract 
on average USD3-4 billion each year in foreign direct investment.  The government also 
used foreign loans for infrastructure development in order to improve its abilities to 
attract more foreign investment.  Starting in 1991, China has seen significant soaring of 
FDI to its economy, as shown in Figure 11.  In 2001, FDI to China surpassed that to the 
U.S. and China became the recipient of the largest proportion of FDI in the world.  
 
Figure 11:  FDI and Foreign Loans to China 
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5.1 FDI to Automotive Industry 
 
Chinese leaders realized that FDI is the only way to boost the automotive industry and 
made tremendous effort to attract global automakers to invest in China.  FDI to the 
automotive industry began to accelerate sharply from 1992, and the accumulated 
investment reached USD20.9 billion by 1998 (Wang, 2001).  Research also indicates 
that about two-thirds of FDI during the period 1981-1996 came from Europe, the U.S. 
and Japan, and the remaining one third was from Hong Kong, Taiwan, and other Asian 
countries (Wang, 2001).  Investments from Europe, the U.S., and Japan have brought 
advanced technologies to China and created an oligopolistic position in China’s car 
production industry (thanks to the Automotive Industry Policy which limited number of 
Chinese automakers for car production).  In contrast, investments from HK, Taiwan, and 
Asian countries focused on labor intensive and less- sophisticated technologies, 
primarily for simple components, motorcycle assembly, and special vehicle retrofitting.  
 
To a large extent, China was very successful in leveraging its market power to use 
foreign investments to fulfill their goals.  Since the early 1980s, China has seen three 
waves of foreign investment to its automobile industry.  The first wave of investment 
began in the mid-1980s and included the establishment of Beijing Jeep and Shanghai 
Volkswagen.  The second wave came in the early 1990s, when FAW-Volkswagen, 
Guangzhou Peugeot, and Dongfeng-Citroen came into existence.  The third wave dates 
to the late 1990s when GM, Honda, Toyota, and Ford secured their respective deals 
creating GM Shanghai, Guangzhou Honda, Tianjin Toyota, and Chang'an-Ford.  
 
Besides foreign investment, China has seen the emergence of significant domestic 
investment since the late 1990s.  They are not from the central government, but from 
private Chinese investors and regional governments.  The past two years have seen the 
emergence of new carmakers: Geely Group, Brilliance China, Jiangsu Nanya, Yueda-
Kia, and Shanghai Qirui.  All these private enterprises entered the automotive market 
with approval from the central government, and attempted to compete with low-end, 
inexpensive cars for mass Chinese consumers.   
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With all these waves of investment, China’s automotive market has become the front 
line of global competition.  With China’s entry to the WTO, another new wave of foreign 
investment is pouring in to the country's automotive sector with a much wider spectrum.  
New areas of investment include sales, distribution, and after-sales services, such as 
automotive financing and insurance.  For example, Ford's Hertz rental car division 
opened offices in Beijing, Guangzhou, and Shanghai in 2002. Volkswagen Finance, 
General Motors Acceptance Corporation., and Ford Motor Credit Co. have all set up 
offices in China (Xing, 2002).  
 
5.2 Major JVs in China 
 
A research report (Wu, 2003) published by the China Automotive Technology and 
Research Center summarized major Sino-foreign automotive joint ventures according a 
“six plus three” framework. The framework illustrates that the world automotive market 
is predominantly controlled by six large companies: GM, Ford, DaimlerChrysler, Toyota, 
VW and Renault-Nissan; and three smaller companies: Honda, PSA, and BMW.  The 
production of these nine companies accounts for around 95% of world production.  The 
research concludes that the development of China’s car industry is significantly affected 
by the existing structure of world automotive industry and the “six plus three” framework 
is also imprinted in China’s car industry.  Likewise, the nine companies, through their 
joint ventures in China, also control over 95% of China’s car market.  Table 13 on next 
page lists the major Sino-foreign joint ventures and cooperative enterprises indexed by 
the nine global companies. 
 
The table clearly reveals that all the major global automakers have entered China at this 
time.  Comparing the table with the top 15 global vehicle makers reported by the U.S.-
published Automotive News 2002 Market Data Book, all 15 are included.  The table 
groups Fuji Heavy Industries and Fiat with GM, Mazda with Ford, Hyundai and 
Mitsubishi with DaimlerChrysler.  Figure 12 indicates the market share of global 
carmakers in China from 1990 to 2002.  Volkswagen established very strong first-mover  
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Table 13: Joint ventures or cooperative enterprises in China’s car industry, 2002 
Global companies JVs or cooperatives in China Key products Notes 
Shanghai GM Economy and 
intermediate cars 
A joint venture between GM and SAIC with equal 
shares. 
GM Shanghai 
Dongyue Auto Co. 
Economy cars  A joint venture among GM, SAIC and GM 
Shanghai with share proportions of 25%, 25% 
and 50% respectively. 
Chongqing Chana-
Suzuki  
Economy cars A joint venture between Chana and Suzuki (GM 
has 20% of shares).  
Nanjing Nanya Economy cars A joint venture between Nanjing Auto Group and 
Fiat (GM has 20% of Fiat shares).  
GM 
Guizhou Lark Mini cars A joint venture between Guihang Group and Fuji 
Heavy Industry (GM holding 21% of Fuji shares) 
Shanghai VW Economy and 
medium-end cars 
A joint venture between VW and SAIC with the 
two sides holding 50% shares respectively 
FAW VW Compact and 
intermediate cars 
A joint venture among VW, Audi and FAW, with 
30%, 10% and 60% shares respectively 
VW 
Anhui Chery  Economy cars A Technological cooperative enterprise between 
VW and Chery  
Changan Ford Economy cars A joint venture between Ford and Changan and 
the two sides taking equal shares  
FAW Hainan Medium end cars A joint venture between FAW and Mazda (Ford 
has 33.4% of Mazda share)  
Ford 
FAW  Medium and high 
end cars 
A cooperative enterprise between FAW and 
Mazda (Ford has 33.4% of Mazda share) 
Tianjin Toyota Economy and 
intermediate cars 
A joint venture between Toyota and FAW Xiali 
with the two sides holding equal shares 
Toyota 
FAW Xiali Mini and economy 
cars 
A cooperative enterprise between Toyota 
(through its subsidiary Daihatsu) and FAW Xiali  
Beijing Jeep Intermediate off-
road vehicles 
A joint venture between DaimlerChrysler and 
Beijing Automotive Industry Co. 
South East (Fujian)  Economy cars (in 
negotiation) 
A joint venture between DaimlerChrysler 
(through its holding company Mitsubishi) and 
Fujian Auto Group  
Beijing Hyundai Economy and 
intermediate cars 
A joint venture between Hyundai in which 
DaimlerChrysler has shares and Beijing 
Automotive Industry Holding Co. 
DaimlerChrysler  
Dongfeng Yueda 
Kia 
Economy cars A joint venture between DFAC, Yueda 
Investment and Kia which is a subsidiary 
company of Hyundai  
Fengshen Auto Series cars A joint venture between Renault-Nissan, through 
Taiwan Yulong which has cooperative 
relationships with Nissan, and DFAC  
Renault-Nissan  
DFAC (Wuhan) Series cars A would-be joint venture between DFAC and 
Nissan and the two sides will hold equal shares 
PSA-Citroen   Dongfeng Citroen 
Auto (Wuhan) 
Compact and 
intermediate cars 
A joint venture between PSA and DFAC 
Guangzhou Honda Economy and 
intermediate cars 
A joint venture between Honda and Guangzhou 
Auto Group  
Honda 
Guangzhou Honda 
for export 
Economy cars A joint venture among Honda, DFAC and 
Guangzhou Auto Group 
Brilliance Auto Co., 
Ltd 
Medium end cars A cooperative enterprise between BMW and 
Golden Cup 
BMW 
Brilliance-BMW (not 
yet approved)  
Intermediate cars A joint venture between Brilliant Group and 
BMW. 
Source: China Automotive Technology & Research Center, 2003. 
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Figure 12:  Market Share of Global Automakers 
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Market Report, 2002-2003; source for 2002 data: China Automotive Technology & Research 
Center, 2003. 
 
advantages in China that no car company in any other major markets has ever enjoyed 
(Murphy, 2003).  Thanks to protection of the industry, foreign investments have largely 
paid off.  With tariffs ranging from 80 to 100 percent, models bear price tags up to 150 
percent higher than those in the United States and Europe, allowing successful joint 
ventures in China to enjoy levels of profitability not seen anywhere else.  In the case of 
Shanghai VW, the domestic sales price in 1993 was around USD24,000 per car (and 
the production cost was around USD10,270).  The price was nearly doubled the world 
price.  For the case of Honda Accord, Honda’s Guangzhou joint venture makes over 
USD3,000 in net profit, three times the net profit for a comparable U.S. model (Gao, 
2002). 
 
It’s worth noting Nissan just invested USD1 billion to buy 50% of the Dongfeng Motor 
Corporation.  (All Dongfeng’s automotive operations except their JVs with Citroen), 
which would give Nissan the most favorable terms for a JV in China.  Nissan aims to 
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boost Dongfeng sales from 265,000 vehicles in 2001 to 550,000 by 2006.  Out of the 
2006 sales, 220,000 will be cars (Wang, 2003). 
 
China has not opened the door for wholly-owned automotive manufacturing in China 
and the shares of foreign partners in joint ventures still cannot exceed 50%.  Thus the 
bulk of foreign investment is equity joint ventures or cooperative joint ventures.  For the 
near future, global companies still cannot set up wholly-owned automotive 
manufacturing in China, but they can export cars to China to compete with domestic 
made cars.   
   
The massive influx of FDI to China’s automotive industry, particularly in the car 
production industry, has fundamentally integrated the Chinese automotive industry into 
the world automotive industry.  China has become a new battlefield for global players.  
The obvious winner so far is Volkswagen, which has used the unique window of 
opportunity to establish first-mover advantages, and essentially monopolized China’s 
car market for 15 years.   
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CHAPTER 6 
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 
 
With the influx of FDI and the formation of Sino-foreign joint ventures, there has been 
large-scale and systematic technology transfer from global automakers to their 
respective joint ventures.  Since the beginning, Chinese leaders have emphasized 
obtaining the advanced automotive technologies necessary to develop the industry.  
The automotive sector is also the area where the earliest wave of Sino-foreign joint 
ventures started.  Beijing Jeep and Shanghai Volkswagen are among the first large-
scale Sino-foreign joint ventures in China.  My research in this area included a series of 
site visits and personal interviews with senior executives from Chinese automotive firms 
located in Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangzhou, as well as academic experts on the 
Chinese automotive industry at the Tsinghua University (see interviewee information in 
the Bibliography section). 
 
6.1 Characteristics of Technology Transfer 
 
A Touchy Issue 
Technology transfer is a sensitive issue for many joint ventures and often was handled 
ineffectively, as described in Jim Mann’s book Beijing Jeep (1997).  The effectiveness 
or ineffectiveness in handling technology transfer issues often determines the success 
or failure of a joint venture.  Technology transfer usually results from the core 
misalignment of the strategic goals of foreign companies and those of the Chinese 
government.  Foreign companies desire to sell products to the large Chinese domestic 
market, while the Chinese government wants to obtain technologies and exports as 
means of obtaining foreign exchange.  This goal non-alignment often leads to difficulties 
when problems arise and compromises between two groups must be sought.  
 
Beijing Jeep serves as a good example for the strategic goal misalignment between the 
U.S. and Chinese partners.  The BAW was primarily interested in obtaining technology 
in order to produce products that they wanted to export, while Chrysler was primarily 
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interested in selling Jeeps to the Chinese market.  Chrysler executives were clearly 
blinded by the enormity of the Chinese market and desired to sell the jointly produced 
products in China.  Many of them felt that by establishing a presence in China they 
could also capture a large portion of the Chinese domestic automotive market (Mann, 
1997). 
 
Chrysler has been in China longer than most any other foreign automotive manufacturer, 
with the first Sino-foreign auto joint venture.  Despite almost a decade experience in 
China, by 1995, Chrysler had pulled out of its bid to build a new minivan joint venture 
enterprise in Shanghai out of complete frustration.  Given their unhappy experience with 
Beijing Jeep over disputes on technology transfer and intellectual property rights, 
Chrysler executives determined the risks associated with the technology transfers, 
proposed licensing deal, and export quotas being requested as part of the Shanghai 
deal were simply too significant (BAX, 1998). 
 
Nevertheless, China is a buyer’s market, and Chrysler clearly suffered from their 
handling of technology transfer issues.  As the very first foreign automotive company to 
enter the Chinese market, Chrysler did not establish any first-mover advantages 
compared with Volkswagen.  In 2002, Chrysler only sold 9,052 cars, including 1,540 
Jeep Cherokees while Volkswagen sold 360,000 cars.  Chrysler’s market position in 
China today is even behind that of such late movers as GM, Honda, and Ford. 
 
In contrast to Chrysler, GM deployed an ambitious and aggressive strategy to transfer 
technology to the China in order to gain market access.  GM beat out other prospective 
foreign partners with a USD1.5 billion bid to produce a variation of Buick sedans with 
the SAIC.  One of the major factors leading to GM’s success was reportedly their 
willingness to transfer a good deal of “state-of-the-art” technology.  GM’s technology 
transfers are primarily in the form of joint research and development projects, as well as 
training of Chinese workers and managers (BXA, 1998). 
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By many accounts, the GM Shanghai deal is viewed as an extremely attractive deal for 
any later comers.  First, the deal let GM strategically build itself into as the second 
largest foreign automotive giant in China.  Second, SAIC is one of the China’s Big Three 
and is subject to many special privileges that other smaller manufacturers would not 
enjoy.  Third, as reported by Professor Zhenwei Qian of Tsinghua University, China is 
strategically developing Shanghai into China’s Detroit and has systematically invested 
in the necessary infrastructure to attract foreign investment on automotive supply-chain 
networks and automotive related services.  Other advantages include Shanghai being 
the most developed city in China with a plentiful supply of skilled labor and engineers.  
Shanghai, with a population of 16 million and 17,000 foreign businesses, also has a 
large and materialized automotive market. 
 
It is also interesting to note that SAIC is expanding into automotive service areas by 
forming a joint venture with AVIS on a vehicle leasing business.  This service will be 
launched in major Chinese cities from 2007.  So far only the Chinese Big Three are 
permitted to operate in the new business areas and SAIC has managed to be the first 
one (Wu, 2003).  It is clear that partnership with SAIC will provide competitive 
advantages to both Volkswagen and GM over other players.   
 
Technology Transfer is Mandatory 
The experience with Chrysler also prompted the Chinese government to streamline the 
process of technology transfer.  The Automotive Industry Policy issued in 1994 served 
as the first document published by Chinese officials in an effort to provide transparent 
investment guidelines for prospective foreign investors.  The policy explicitly spells out 
the following technology transfer requirements for establishment of an automotive 
manufacturing joint venture in China (BXA, 1998): 
 
• “An office responsible for technological research and development must be set 
up within the enterprise. The office will have the capacity to update products.” 
• “The enterprise must have a capacity for manufacturing products which attain the 
international technological levels of the 1990s.” 
• “The joint venture enterprise will obtain the foreign exchange it needs mainly 
through exporting its products.” 
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• “The joint venture must give priority to locally made spare or component parts 
when they need them.” 
 
Chinese leaders realized that an effective way to push for technology transfer is to 
require components to be made in China rather allowing foreign firms, as they had 
hoped, to simply import components from global sources and assemble them in China. 
For foreign firms to reach sufficiently high levels of quality local content, they have two 
options: to either encourage their suppliers to also come to China, or to train local 
suppliers to produce quality products.  Either way, technology is transferred to China.  
The Automotive Industry Policy explicitly increased the levels of local content mandates.  
For passenger car production, they are:  
 
• 40% local content at start up (this had previously been required only after the 
third year in operation) 
• 60% by the second year  
• 80% by the third year   
 
Similar local content requirements were set for the manufacturing of key automotive 
components such as engines, transmissions, airbags, and antilock braking system, and 
the local content levels for trucks are even higher.   
 
Local content requirements are not unknown in developing nations, but they are rarely 
so high as in China.  The policy explicitly calls for production of domestic automobiles 
and parts as substitutes for imports, and forces joint ventures to use domestic products 
whether they are comparable in quality and  price or not.  Clearly, the Automotive 
Industry Policy made China’s intentions and motivations for technology transfer more 
clear and transparent.  Figure 13 compares the localization rates of Beijing Jeep 
(Chrysler), Shanghai Volkswagen, and Guangzhou Peugeot from 1985 to 1993.  Clearly, 
Volkswagen localized their component manufacturing in China more and faster than did 
Chrysler and Peugeot.  Shanghai Volkswagen managed to allocate 20,000 RMB (about 
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USD2,400) per car from sales to a special fund for localization, which has been very 
helpful in smoothing the localization process.6 
   
Figure 13:  Localization of Chrysler, Volkswagen, and Peugeot 
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Shanghai Volkswagen formed a "Shanghai Santana Local Content Co-operative” by 
bringing together the parts makers, banks, universities, and research institutes.  Being a 
member of the co-operative means a long-term contract and steady supply of 
components.  This provides the key incentives for the component suppliers to execute 
continuous quality improvement. 
 
The reaction of the global automakers towards the local content requirement can be an 
important factor affecting the performance of joint ventures.  A good comparison can be 
made between the success of Shanghai VW and the failure of Guangzhou Peugeot 
which both started producing cars in the same year. To capture the short-term 
profitability, the latter preferred to import component knock-down kits and assemble 
them in China with little effort expended in developing local component suppliers. On 
                                            
6 My interview with Wenda Chen of Shanghai Volkswagen on December 26, 2002 
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the contrary, the Shanghai VW adopted a rigorous local content program together with 
the support from the local authority (Wang, 2001).  Guangzhou Peugeot serves as the 
only failure example of Sino-foreign automotive joint venture by Peugeot’s complete 
withdrawal from the deal because of disputes associated with local content and 
technology transfer.  The Chinese partner later formed a new joint venture with 
Japanese Honda, the Guangzhou Honda. 
 
Technology Transfer at Supplier Level 
The mandatory requirements on local content have forced many world-class automotive 
parts suppliers to follow their Original OEM leaders to China: Delphi Automotive 
Systems, Bosch, Valeo, Siemens, Dana, Allied Signal, Lucas Varity, United 
Technologies, ITT, TRW, Rockwell, Tenneco, Cooper, and others.  The Chinese 
automotive component industry has been profoundly changed by the presence of these 
foreign parts suppliers. 
 
Figure 14:  U.S.-China Trade on Auto Parts 
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Given that the Chinese government requires automotive JVs to export to obtain foreign 
exchange, it is likely that many China-made components are exported back to their 
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OEM’s home country.  U.S. trade figures indicate that U.S. imports of automotive parts 
from China have risen dramatically since 1992, almost tripling in value by 1996-97 (see 
Figure 14).  The situation is likely to change as the impact of WTO membership slowly 
takes effect. 
 
Establishing R&D in China 
In addition to technology transfer in manufacturing and local content, the Automotive 
Industry Policy also calls for the establishment of technology development centers by 
each major joint venture deal.  For example, as part of GM Shanghai deal, GM has set 
up three R&D centers in China to date and at least two more are planned.  In 1995, GM 
set up the “GM in China Technology Institute” at Tsinghua University in Beijing for R&D, 
post-graduate education, and training in auto-making.  R&D work includes fuel quality 
studies, piston ring package development, crash injury and airbag module studies, and 
pedestrian protection test modeling.  In the same year, GM also set up the “Powertrain 
Technology Institute” at Shanghai Jiaotong University.  The most recent one is a USD4 
million R&D center at GM Shanghai (BXA, 1998). 
 
Ford’s joint venture deal followed the same path.  Ford has established R&D centers at 
Tsinghua University and Jiling University, a research lab at Shanghai Jiaotong 
University (involving the latest software for advanced computer-aided design, 
manufacturing, product information management and training of Chinese employees), 
and recent signed an agreement with Fudan University to establish a “Joint Research 
Institute of Automotive Electronics” (BXA, 1998). 
 
Technology Transfer Comparison among European Union, Japan, and U.S. 
One interesting point is to compare the technology transfer strategy of automakers from 
different countries.  A research conducted by U.S. Department of Commerce (BXA, 
1998) indicates that the EU has fully embraced technology transfers to China, while 
Japan has been comparatively much more conservative, and the United States’ 
approach has been somewhere in the middle. 
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The EU views technology transfer as an effective way to gain access the Chinese 
market and has adopted a formal policy to embrace the transfer of technology to China. 
The Commission of the European Union’s long-term strategy states that initiatives to 
promote economic and social reform should offer training and technical assistance to 
support modernization and market oriented policies in key economic sectors. 
 
The European automotive industry has been systematically transferring technology to 
Chinese manufacturers by actively providing industrial training in manufacturing as well 
as management training to their Chinese partners.  Judging from what European 
automakers have achieved in China, for example, that Volkswagen alone occupies over 
half the market share in China, it validates that more technology transfer results more 
market access.  The European policy on actively engaging on technology transfer 
should be viewed as success.  
 
In contrast to the EU, Japanese firms seem to think that exporting technology would 
gain them comparatively little in the future.  Japan’s relationship with China is very 
complex compared with that of the EU or the U.S. for both geographic and historical 
reasons.  The result is that the Japanese government aggressively using government 
loans to smooth over relations with China.  However, while anxious to enter China the 
Japanese automotive industry is quietly reluctant to transfer advanced technologies.  In 
the early 1980s, Chinese government actively invited the Japanese to be the first 
movers to China’s automotive sector, but they declined. 
 
In contrast to the Japanese, American and European carmakers accepted the Chinese 
invitation and strategically entered the Chinese automotive market at the earliest 
possible time.  It was until the early 1990s when the Japanese realized the 
disadvantages of not being present in China and the dominant position achieved by 
Volkswagen.  At this realization, they then became active investors in China.  This 
situation is quite in contrast to Japan’s presence in Southeast Asia, where Japanese 
carmakers are not only engaging in on-site production, but also dominate the market.  
Many believe that Japan is intentionally withholding its technologies from the Chinese 
market because they feared that China would become an industry power.   
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Direct and Indirect Technology Transfer 
Almost all technology transfers over the past 50 years, including the earliest one with 
the Soviet Union, have followed the direct technology transfer model, which requires 
formal tie-ups with foreign automakers and parts manufacturers, or direct assistance 
from foreign engineers (Cusumano, 1985).  Recently, some emerging private Chinese 
carmakers began using the indirect technology transfer model, i.e., selective copying of 
designs and manufacturing techniques from various foreign producers, and the 
importation and copying of machinery.  The Geely Group, one of the newly approved 
private carmakers in China, chose not to form a production joint venture with foreign 
players but signed contracts with Fiat and Daewoo for product development.  As a new 
entrant, Geely also lacked capital.  However, rather than seek investment from global 
auto giants, Geely recently raised USD60 million investments from the Guorun Holding, 
a Hong Kong-based financial group with no background in the automotive industry 
(CATARA, 2003). 
 
6.2 Impact of Technology Transfer 
 
Productivity Improvement 
The FDI and technology transfer have profoundly impacted the Chinese automotive 
industry and have significantly improved the average performance and productivity of 
Chinese manufacturing firms.  Today in China, joint ventures generally having higher 
performance, both market share and productivity, than domestic firms.  For example, in 
1998, joint ventures accounted for 57% of the total output of vehicles even though the 
number of joint ventures only accounted for 33% of the total car makers in China.  Table 
14 indicates the performance differences by the nature of firm in 1997.  The productivity 
in European, American and Japanese joint ventures were four times as high as the 
average industry level, and more than five times as high as the SOEs.  With respect to 
other financial indicators such as the profit per employee, return on assets, and return 
on sales, joint ventures also performed better than the SOEs and collectively-owned 
Chinese firms.  This clearly shows FDI and technology transfer have given joint 
ventures firm-specific advantages over local ones. 
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Table 14: Performance difference by the nature of the firm, 1997 
 JVs with 
Europe, US, 
& Japan 
JVs with HK 
& other Asian 
countries 
 
State-owned 
Enterprises 
 
Collectively-
owned Firms 
Average 
Firms in 
China 
Productivity (RMB/Emp) 564,000 272,000 104,000 99,000 138,000 
Profit (RMB/Emp) 28,000 21,000 1,000 1,600 3,900 
Return on Assets (%) 4.20 6.04 0.50 1.59 1.73 
Return on Sales (%) 5.56 8.62 0.98 1.74 2.93 
Source: Wang, 2001.  (Productivity = Revenue/Total Employee). 
 
 
Management Improvement 
Besides technology transfer, there has been extensive management know-how transfer 
from foreign partners to their Chinese partners.  China clearly benefited from the “free 
training” on Western management practices from their foreign partners and gained a 
pool of management workforce.  Due to the natural of the central planning economy 
China has had, manufacturing factories were just one element of the vast planned 
national economy.  Executives from automotive factories only worried about producing 
pre-assigned production tasks and never had responsibilities for sales.  Many of them 
had no sense about marketing or customer relationship management.  Foreign 
automakers, particularly early entrants, had to train their Chinese partners on the most 
basic management knowledge.  For late entrants, this is not a major issue anymore.  
For example, when SAIC started its joint venture with GM, most of the SAIC executives 
had work experience with Volkswagen and directly transferred their knowledge to the 
joint venture operations with GM.  This greatly frustrated the Volkswagen executives, 
because they felt the Chinese took the business practices and trade secrets from 
Volkswagen to GM, letting GM gain unfair advantage.7 
 
Executives in China were able to combine Western management knowledge with their 
Chinese expertise and apply them to joint ventures successfully, adapted to a recent 
SAIC newsletter indicates that a new meaning was invented for the acronym “SAIC” 
which stands for:  
 
 
                                            
7 My interview with Wenda Chen of Shanghai Volkswagen on December 26, 2002. 
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 S –  Satisfaction for customers 
 A –  Advantage through innovation 
 I –  Internalization in operating 
 C –  Concentration on people 
 
This reflects how Chinese managers combine western marketing techniques with 
traditional motivation techniques for the workforce and customers. 
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CHAPTER 7 
WTO MEMBERSHIP 
 
7.1 China’s Journey to WTO 
 
China’s quest for WTO membership began in 1986, and proceeded slowly.  There was 
strong resistance from industries that were not yet ready to face foreign competition, 
among them the automotive industry.  Many feared that opening Chinese markets to 
foreign competition would result in massive unemployment.  The automotive related 
industries in China employ some 7 million workers, about 3.3% of total Chinese urban 
workforce (CATARC, 2002).  The industry was particularly worried that most of the 
small-scale automotive manufacturers and suppliers would not survive the foreign 
competition and would be forced to close (Harwit 2001).  In their 1998 study, Chinese 
officials estimated that the automotive industry would need at least nine years to be 
competitive under WTO rules.  Even large players such as FAW which has a JV with 
Volkswagen feared foreign competition.  FAW officials said in 1999 they would need at 
least two to three more years to catch up (Harwit, 2001).   
 
Proponents argued that competition with foreign firms would sharpen the quality of 
Chinese production and increase access to foreign markets.  As pointed out by Mr. 
Hang Zhao, President of the China Automotive technology & Research Center, during 
his visit to MIT in early 2002, 8 that the WTO membership would provide the market 
force needed to close the most inefficient small-scale firms.  Facing the mixed picture of 
China’s readiness for WTO entry, the Chinese visionary leader, then Premier Zhu 
Rongji, made the decision to move forward and pushed China into the WTO. 
 
On November 11, 2001, China officially committed itself to the terms of the WTO 
Agreements.  This would mark the ending of the powerful Automotive Industry Policy 
implemented since 1994 and the beginning of an unprecedented new era for the 
Chinese automotive industry.  Before entry into the WTO, China clearly had hoped to 
                                            
8 Hang Zhao was a member of a Tianjin City delegate that visited MIT in early 2002.   
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build a self-sufficient and export-oriented automotive industry, such as Japan and Korea 
have done.  According to Chinese trade statistics, in 1986, 80% of all cars in China 
were imports, whereas currently less than 10% of China’s automobiles are imports.  
China had hoped, by 2010, to achieve zero imports of foreign automobiles and export 
10% of its domestically made cars.  The WTO membership will change the picture 
completely as the Chinese government essentially gave up most of their controlling 
leverages in order to gain U.S. support for the WTO membership.   
 
What Did China Agree? 
So what did China sign for WTO membership?  WTO is a group of trade agreements 
between the 140 member states that set for a rule-based system for international trade, 
intellectual property, and foreign direct investment. The more well-known agreements 
include the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the General Agreement 
on Trade in Services (GATS), and Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPS).  There are actually over 60 separate agreements, protocols, 
and understandings that bind members to the WTO. 
 
China’s accession on December 11, 2001 subjects it to all of the agreements in force on 
that date, each of which constitutes binding international law superceding conflicting 
domestic legislation, such as China’s Automotive Industry Policy.  The next to last 
paragraph of the Protocol states that the WTO Agreements are also to be registered 
under the provisions of Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations, which signifies 
its binding nature as an international treaty obligation of all signatory countries (Nee, 
2002). 
 
7.2 Impact on Automotive Industry 
 
The terms of the WTO Agreements call for commitments that would significant impacts 
on China’s ability to control its automotive industry.  These include tariff reduction 
commitments, commitments as to how China will comply with the WTO Agreements, 
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and commitments for opening special markets.  Specifically, China committed to the 
following:  
 
Import Tariff Reduction 
China committed to significantly reduce import tariffs for automobiles and parts.  Table 
15 illustrates the tariff reduction schedule for passenger cars.  Import tariffs will be 
reduced to 25% by 2006.  
 
Table 15: Tariff Rate Reductions for Imported Cars 
Historical 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
 180% 180% 180% 110% 100% 100% 80% 80% 
WTO-era 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 7/2006 
<=3000cc 63.5% 51.9% 43.8% 38.2% 34.2% 30% 28% 25% 
>3000cc 77.5% 61.7% 50.7% 43.0% 37.6% 30% 28% 25% 
     Source of historical tariff: Ping 2001, source of WTO-era tariff: Nee, 2002. 
 
Licenses and Quotas 
China committed to eliminate import license requirements for passenger vehicles by 
2005; for buses, trucks, and motorcycles by 2004; and for engines by 2003.  China 
committed to increase import quotas for all automotive vehicles 15% annually and 
completely phase out quotas by 2005, as shown in Table 16. 
 
Table 16: Import Quotas on Motor Vehicle Products ($million) 
 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Motor vehicles and parts $6,000 $7,935 $9,125 $10,494 No quota 
Motorcycles and parts $286 $376 $432 $497 No quota 
Automotive Chassis $88 $116 $133 $153 No quota 
 Source: Xing, 2002. 
 
Distribution 
Prior to WTO accession, foreign-invested enterprises were not permitted to sell or 
distribute products they did not manufacture themselves, or in the case of holding 
companies, products that were not manufactured by companies in which they had 
invested. This prevented foreign-invested companies from distributing imported 
products within China and prevented the development of distributor networks. 
 64
By 2002, foreign-invested companies began to be permitted to distribute both domestic 
and foreign products. Restrictions on the establishment of distribution companies will be 
completely phased out within three years of accession.   
 
The timetable for distribution opening is as follows:  
• within one year of accession, wholesale joint ventures may be established with a 
minority foreign investment,  
• in the second year, majority foreign investment will be permitted, 
• in the third year, wholly foreign-owned wholesale distributors will be permitted. 
 
Therefore, both domestic and foreign companies will be permitted to distribute autos 
and automotive parts into any part of China after a three-year period.  
 
Retailing 
WTO membership permits foreign retail ventures. Foreign retailers are permitted to 
supply services in the form of joint ventures in the five Special Economic Zones 
(Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Shantou, Xiamen and Hainan) and six cities (Beijing, Shanghai, 
Tianjin, Guangzhou, Dalian and Qingdao). Within two years after China’s WTO 
accession, foreign majority control will be permitted in joint venture retailing enterprises 
and the market will open to all provincial capitals, as well as Chongqing and Ningbo. 
 
Local Authority 
Provincial authorities will be able to approve investments in the automotive sector of up 
to USD150 million (increased from USD30 million), thereby substantially reducing red 
tape for car manufacturers. Like many WTO commitments, this one will be phased in 
over three years: joint ventures will be able to have provincial level approvals of under 
USD60 million after one year, USD90 million after 2 years, and USD150 million after 4 
years from accession. 
 
Engine Production 
China’s joint-venture requirement of foreign equity not exceed 50% was removed, 
allowing wholly foreign owned production of engines. This occurred on accession. 
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Financial Services 
Non-bank financial institutions are now permitted to provide automotive and vehicle 
financing and insurance services without any geographic limitations to market access. 
 
Local Content 
The local content ratios requirements were removed on China’s WTO accession.  This 
would have profound impact and serious pressure to existing suppliers as their OEMs 
may skip domestic suppliers and direct go to their global sourcing for parts.  This also 
would courage efficient suppliers to be integrated into OEM’s global sourcing system. 
 
China’s entry into the WTO will increase pressure on local producers. It will also allow 
global carmakers to own businesses in which they have unmatchable advantages: sales, 
service, and distribution, as well as loan services to car buyers, which are sure to be 
welcome in a market where personal credit is scarce. 
 
7.3 Three Possible Scenarios 
 
Feenstra and his collogues (2001) conducted an impact study of WTO membership to 
the Chinese automotive industry where they postulated three possible scenarios.  The 
first scenario is of negative impact where China’s domestic industry (including joint 
ventures) is swamped by imports, and becomes a minor player even in the domestic 
automotive market.  This scenario is possible if foreign companies with relatively small 
production presence in China, such as DaimlerChrysler and Hyundai, become 
aggressive about exporting cars to China.  A basic logic assumed is that imported cars 
selling at competitive prices could be more attractive to Chinese residents than 
domestically made cars with lesser technologies.  This would be even more possible if 
Volkswagen, GM, Toyota and Honda forego domestic production and ship cars to China. 
 
The second scenario is of positive impact where China’s domestic industry rises to the 
challenge of WTO membership, and eventually becomes an important world center of 
automotive production.  This scenario assumes that companies such as Volkswagen 
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and GM would continue to assure product quality and update their vehicles to world 
standards.  Given the Chinese automotive market structure, if all foreign joint ventures 
expand product lines towards low-end economical cars that are affordable to middle 
income Chinese families, the challenge of imported cars could fail to materialize.  
Eventually, China would absorb advanced technology, and emerge as a world-class 
automotive producer, as South Korea did in the 1980s and 1990s. 
 
The third scenario is on middle ground where the Chinese automotive industry would 
muddle along with characteristics similar to the status quo, with some substantial 
improvement in the efficiency of the domestic industry, but not enough to make China 
an important automobile exporter.  This scenario assumes that the WTO rules fail to 
have much real impact in China.  Although import tariffs fall, China may try to use 
regional and local non-tariff barriers to continue subtle protection of the domestic 
industry.  Based on their study and survey of executives, Feenstra and his colleagues 
estimated a 20% probability for the first scenario, 30% for second scenario, and 50% for 
the third scenario. 
 
Regardless of which scenario actually occurs, it is predictable that imported cars will 
increase as China lowers the tariffs, which will put serious pressures on the existing 
joint ventures in China, and will improve their global competitiveness. The global 
carmakers who have already invested heavily in the Chinese market will be confronted 
with intensified competition from the late-comers, which therefore would force them to 
speed up their technology transfer efforts, model variety, and price reductions.  
 
WTO Will Inject Competition to China 
One of the greatest benefits of FDI to the local firms, in theory, is the injection of 
competition and technologies that lead to the exit of inefficient enterprises and the 
raising of efficiency in the industry.  The precondition on this conclusion is the existence 
of a contestable market which arguably did not exist in China before its entry into WTO.  
Wang (2001) pointed out that when investors are located behind tariff barriers or given 
quasi-monopoly status, they tend to transfer only less-advanced technologies that are 
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sufficient to produce in an un-competitive market.  The Brazilian automotive industry in 
the days of import substitution is a perfect example. If foreign investors face intense 
competition either from importation or from other investors, they have an incentive to 
transfer technology in order to be able to compete more effectively.   
 
Global Players Will Bring Technology to China Faster 
When Volkswagen first started in Shanghai in 1985, they initially introduced a 1970s 
model, the Santana, to China, and only upgraded it to the Santana 2000 model until 
1995.  They sold essentially the same car for 15 years without technological innovation.  
The Santana was China’s best selling car for a long time because of the lack of 
competition.  As more and more players entered the game, competition became more 
intense, forcing each player to speed up their introduction of new models to China only 
months after their launch in more mature markets.  For example, VW now plans to 
introduce one or two new models every year in China, and GM Shanghai recently 
introduced the popular Opel Corsa model from GM Germany to GM Shanghai.  
DaimlerChrysler recently approved plans to introduce the Pajero, a best selling SUV 
made by Mitsubishi, to be produced by Beijing Jeep (Wu, 2003).  In 2000, automotive 
consumers had only eight models to choose from; in 2003, they will have 65 models 
available to them (Murphy, 2001). 
 
Many people believe the quality gap between joint venture-made cars and imported 
models would get closer as post-WTO competition really picks up.  However, JV-made 
cars may still not be equally cost-competitive, given that the import tariff would remain at 
25% and there might be informal and regional restrictions imposed on imported cars. 
Many believe that China will not become an important exporter in the region or 
worldwide.  Given the size of China’s potential internal market, there seems little reason 
to focus on exports. 
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Potential Obstacles in Post-WTO Era 
Many people believe that China will not go for a straightforward implementation of WTO 
rules and protectionism will likely continue with a variety of non-tariff barriers.  The 
Chinese government could continue to informally constrain imports and favor domestic 
production even as markets open up and formal tariff barriers come down.  It is possible 
they would find ways to do that but still be in compliance with the WTO rules.  The 
biggest skepticism are in China’s regional governments as they have incentives and 
certain leverage not to implement WTO measures fully within their regions.  Other 
concerns involve China’s social and political stability.  Any WTO measures could be 
questionable if China social stability or political system is endangered.  Given the 
Chinese history over the last 50 years, the concerns are legitimate.  In the new era of 
SARS (severe acute respiratory syndrome), risks are no longer merely social or political, 
but also include disease, quarantine, and social reactions to health concerns.  
 
Preparation of Global Carmakers 
To prepare for post-WTO era competition, global carmakers have been actively 
adjusting their strategy to make their operations in China internationally competitive.  
 
A study by RolandBerger Strategy Consultants (Xu, 2001) reveals that currently 
Volkswagen’s parts cost in China is about 20-40% higher than elsewhere in the world 
market.  As a result, they will have to cut down their sourcing costs by 30% in 5 years.  
Volkswagen already announced they would use their global sourcing system for parts 
as China lowers their tariffs.  Local suppliers are being pressured to cut down costs and 
hopefully eventually to be integrated into Volkswagen’s global sourcing network.  
Volkswagen already began to integrate their suppliers of Shanghai Volkswagen and 
FAW-Volkswagen.  For distribution, Volkswagen already formed a 50:50 sales joint 
venture with SAIC and will merge sales and service network into unified full-range 
dealer network offering both sales and after-sales services.  Volkswagen also is 
preparing to offer financing and leasing services as more regulations phase out. 
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GM also announced they would globally source for parts, but would give preference to 
local suppliers if they meet requirements.  GM is actively assisting local suppliers in 
improving efficiency and integrating qualified local suppliers into GM’s global sourcing 
system.  GM is also engaged in dealer networks development with full-range service 
and is preparing to offer financing, leasing and second car sales service. 
 
The biggest issue facing the foreign automakers is the future of equity control in 
automotive assembly operations.  China's WTO commitments do not include a timetable 
to eliminate such equity controls, and the Chinese government is expected to limit 
foreign equity ownership to 50% or less for some time to come.  Foreign automakers 
with joint ventures in China have expressed their readiness to buy out their Chinese 
partners and are expected to increasingly pressure the government to lift the cap on 
foreign ownership (Xing, 2002) 
 
Industry Shakeout 
 
Figure 15: Number of Firms in the U.S. Automotive Industry 
 
Source: James Utterback, Mastering the Dynamics of Innovation, 1994. 
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Figure 15 illustrate the research of Professor James Utterback of MIT Sloan School of 
Management on the industry dynamics of the entry and exit of firms as technology and 
market developed.  Part of his research was reported in his book “Mastering the 
Dynamics of Innovation” (1994).  Among the industries he studied is the U.S. 
automotive industry during its early development period.  Professor Utterback’s 
research shows that there were less than five automakers in the U.S. in 1900 when the 
automotive industry first started.  As technology and markets developed, more than 100 
firms entered and participated in the industry for a period of five years or longer.  The 
total number of automakers peaked at 75 by the early 1920s.   As the automotive 
technology became more mature and competition became more intense, an industry 
shakeout began, and many smaller or uncompetitive firms were either absorbed or 
pushed out by newly emerged industry leaders.  By the early 1940s, the total number of 
automakers decreased to about 15.  Although China’s current situation is not entirely 
comparable to the early development of the U.S. automotive industry, I believe that 
China’s WTO membership marks the beginning of an industry shakeout period in China 
and that the total number of automakers is bound to decrease within the coming years.  
 
7.4 What Has Happened? 
 
2002 was the first year that China has operated under the WTO rules.  So far, there are 
no substantial studies or researches on the early impact of WTO membership.  Based 
on interviews with Chinese executives conducted by the author during December 2002, 
here are some early indications: 
 
Several OEM and supplier executives9 said that the WTO impact in its first year was not 
as bad as many people in China had anticipated.  Many early forecasts on automotive 
sales in 2002 predicted that 2002 would be a slow year as consumers would forego 
planned purchases of domestically made cars and wait for imported cars at lower prices.  
However, the 2002 automotive sales turned out to be a boom and more cars were sold 
than in 2001.  Almost all the carmakers sold as much as they were able to produce.  
                                            
9 These include Hongjie Wang and Fred Yang of Cummins China, a major engine supplier in China. 
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Chinese automotive enterprises are more competitive than anticipated by many people.  
There are several factors explaining this point.  First, under true competition, many 
Chinese enterprises, to avoid being closed, are able to cut down costs and improve 
their competitiveness.  Many of them adjusted their strategy, focusing on the low-end 
markets to avoid direct competition with big automakers.  The Chinese automotive 
market is large enough to allow them to survive at least for a while.  Irregularity of the 
Chinese market is a major issue and a challenge for foreigners as the country slowly 
transforms itself from a planned economy into a market economy.  However, the 
irregularity could be factor that favors local Chinese players.  Finally, support from 
regional governments likely played a role.  There are many techniques local 
governments can use.  These include: reducing local taxes, getting favorable funding 
terms, and government-sponsored training. 
 
The emergence of private carmakers in China, such as the Geely Group and Brilliance 
Group, is worth attention from global giants.  These firms developed their car 
manufacturing ability without government support.  Ms. Yang Bai, Vice President of 
Geely Group, said that private carmakers in China have organizational and cost 
competitive advantages over SOEs and even foreign joint ventures.  They are agile and 
closer to the market, in particular, the low-end market, than the SOEs and foreign joint 
ventures.10  Some consider them the new hope for China’s automotive industry as these 
firms have strategically positioned themselves for China’s low-end market, which is 
likely to boom but has largely been ignored by foreign joint ventures. 
 
As discussed in Chapter 6, Geely adopted a strategy based on an indirect technology 
transfer model.  Cusumano (1995) compared the early development strategies of 
Toyota and Nissan, where Nissan adopted direct technology transfer from the American 
automotive industry and was able to develop mass production capabilities in a short 
time frame.  In contrast, Toyota adopted an indirect technology transfer strategy and 
chose to selectively import pieces technologies that best fitted Toyota’s ability to absorb 
and later to perfect them, which eventually yielded Toyota’s competitive advantage over 
                                            
10 My interview with Yang Bai of Geely Group on December 26, 2002. 
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Nissan.  While Geely is living in a totally different time and environment, a comparable 
strategy may still be effective and help them gain competitive advantages over SOEs 
and joint ventures.  If companies, such as Geely, success as a low-cost leader, they 
may be able to move from a dominant position in the low-end market up the chain to 
more expensive and profitable cars, as described by Professor of Clayton Christensen 
of Harvard Business School in his book (1997): The Innovator’s Dilemma. 
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CHAPTER 8 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
Three major conclusions are made based on discussions in this thesis. 
 
First, China has benefited radically from foreign investments and technology 
transfers. 
 
The Chinese automotive industry was essentially transferred from foreign countries.  
China first obtained truck production technologies from the former Soviet Union in the 
1950s and slowly grew the truck manufacturing capability to 1.7 million annual 
production units.  However, technology innovation in China has been slow and the 
Chinese trucks are uncompetitive, based on quality, compared with world standards, 
they are cheap but do not have very good quality. 
 
Then, in the 1980s and 1990s, China obtained mass production technologies of 
passenger cars from Americans, Europeans, and the Japanese firms.  China essentially 
had no car production before the 1980s and most cars in China were imported.  With 
China’s economic reform, China has successfully attracted billions of dollars in foreign 
investment, which have helped the automotive industry to upgrade its technology and 
efficiency levels.  The industry has made remarkable progress, productivity levels and 
management capacity in joint ventures have increased significantly over average 
Chinese enterprises.  China has grown to be the eighth largest automobile producer in 
the world, and the growing trend is likely to continue in years to come. 
 
Although China has gained a 2-million car production capacity from foreign investment, 
automotive joint ventures are controlled by foreigners and China has not yet  absorbed 
the full capabilities of automotive development and production.  China would have to 
really inject rigorous market competition into the automotive industry in order to attract 
faster and broader technology transfers. 
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Second, China’s automotive policies lacked strategic thinking and failed to lead 
the industry to be integrated and competitive.  
 
After initial establishing a truck production industry, China has adopted a defensive and 
self-reliance policy which proliferated small-scale automotive manufacturing factories all 
around the country and led to a fragmented, decentralized, and uncompetitive industry.  
The Chinese government pulled all the levers to promote an indigenous pillar industry 
through internally favorable policies, high tariff protection, and foreign investment.  
However, they essentially failed to achieve what they had intended.  As MIT Sloan 
Professor Jay Forrester notes, “structure drives behavior.”  The Chinese government is 
trying to use policies which contradict the protectionist industry structure, which shapes 
people’s and companies’ behavior. 
 
Misleading Industry Orientation 
The central Chinese government has always treated the industry with an infant status 
and kept it in a protectionist environment.  This research shows that the infant industry 
thinking has led to serious consequences: high protection yields high profits from price 
distortion and leads to inefficiency, diseconomy of scale, and un-competitiveness.  The 
Chinese automotive enterprises have undergone 50 years of manufacturing and over 
two decades of technology importation.  They should have been able to mature more 
rapidly had they been subjected to rigorous domestic and foreign competitions. 
 
Lack of Coherence between Policies 
China’s automotive policies lacked coherence between trade and investment, between 
protection and competition, between production-oriented and market-oriented policies.   
On the one hand, China hopes foreign investment and advanced technologies would 
boost China’s automotive industry and increase its competitiveness.   On the other hand, 
it adopts a high tariff protection policy that provides no incentives for continuing 
technological innovation, which consequently undermines the potential positive impacts 
that the foreign investment could have made.  China issued many rules and hoped 
these rules would create competition, but they failed to understand that real competition 
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was impossible under heavy protection.  China hopes to prompt a market-driven 
economy, but its automotive policies are production-driven and prohibit foreign 
companies from entering the market.  
 
It is evident from my research that foreign investors are benefiting from the protection 
policies.  They even lobbied government for more protection in order to make more 
profits.  The early entrants clearly lacked motivation to innovate or bring in new 
technology after their initial investment.  The research also shows that the combination 
of high local content requirement and a protected market made both domestic suppliers 
and foreign carmakers highly inefficient. 
 
Protection is the Root Problem 
My research shows that the high protection policy is the root of many problems China 
has experienced. First of all, it is arguable that the protectionist policy led to the 
proliferation of inefficient small-scale manufacturers in China, as economy of scale was 
no longer a necessary condition for companies to be profitable. 
 
Secondly, protectionist policies led to foreign companies lobbying for more protection 
rather than upgrading technology and improving competitiveness. They clearly have  
incentives to request protection in order to gain an advantage over their competitors 
outside of China.  Furthermore, regional protectionism is created under the combined 
forces of foreign firms and local government.  For example, Shanghai Volkswagen has 
succeeded in making the Shanghai City Government forbid other cars from entering the 
Shanghai taxi market and government purchase plan. The same protection measures 
are taken by the other joint ventures over the local region (Wang, 2001). Therefore, 
China’s passenger car market is highly fragmented. 
 
Protection has led to strong regional incentives to support local automotive 
manufacturers for providing employment and preventing them from being closed, which 
significantly decreases the speed for industry consolidation.  The central government 
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will be challenged to achieve what is spelled out in the 10th Five-Year Plan within the 
specified time frame.   
 
Lack of Effective Competition Policy 
It is clear that China lacks an effective competition policy which is an absolute necessity 
for a market driven economy.  Given the strong resistance to China’s accession to WTO, 
it is even questionable whether the leaders in the automotive industry were aware of the 
need for such a policy.  Under the opening-up policy China has had, the central 
government has been pushed for deregulation in many industries in order to bring in 
competition.  However, the automotive industry continuously received high protection 
and no competition, which may well explain the inefficiencies of the industry.  
Fortunately, China’s top visionary leaders came to realize that market competition is 
more important than the protection, and successfully pushed China into the WTO. 
 
Failure to Spend Capital Strategically 
There are two aspects to China’s capital spending.  First, China spent more on 
automotive imports compared to the total combined domestic and foreign investment.  
Developing countries, such as China, usually lack capital and foreign reserves for 
economic development.  It is questionable why USD63 billion was spent to import cars 
while only USD26 billion was invested in the industry.11  Second, in China, domestic 
firms are not treated equally. SOEs systematically receive preferential support while 
private firms are discriminated against.  However, the performance of those SOEs is 
generally poor.  The mandatory partnership of FDI with SOEs may prove to be a heavy 
cost to Chinese consumers and China’s economic growth.   
 
Equity JVs Slow Down Technology Transfer 
The mandatory joint venture requirement that foreign equity not exceed 50% does not 
achieve the objective of management control and desired level of technology transfer.  
This research shows that most joint ventures are “controlled” by foreign partners despite 
                                            
11  As I summed the figures from tables of the Chinese Automotive Yearbook 2002, it clearly made no 
sense that the capital used for imports is almost three times of the total combined capital invested to the 
industry. Give a man a fish, feed him today, teach a man to fish, feed him for life.”  Was this not the rule? 
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of their minority status and the JV pattern decreases the speed and depth of technology 
transfer.  Research indicates that average parent firms transfer technology to wholly-
owned subsidiaries in developing countries one-third faster than to joint ventures (Wang, 
2001).  That is to say, technology transfer is relatively limited under the pattern of joint 
venture.  In China, it took five years for local content to reach 50%, and ten years to 
reach 90%.  In the world market, the product life cycle of a model is normally around 
three-four years.  It is therefore no wonder that most of the cars produced in China until 
the late 1990s were outdated models.  
 
Although the influx of foreign investment and technologies into China has significantly 
upgraded China’s automotive capabilities, with 50 years of development, Chinese 
automakers only mastered the basic manufacturing and assembly of vehicles. China 
still lacks sufficient understanding of the complete automotive development process 
from cradle to grave.  All joint ventures are making cars developed in foreign countries.  
None of them were developed in China.  All production in any scale and with any real 
quality has been done with the help of a foreign partner in a joint venture.12  It’s 
arguable that had China allowed earlier wholly-owned automotive manufacturing, it 
could have obtained more automotive development and production capabilities, more 
management capabilities, and more rigorous training than they have now. 
 
Third, WTO membership will inject long-needed market competition to China and 
will cause fundamental changes to the automotive industry. 
 
The WTO membership would inject real market competition to China’s automotive 
industry and provide foreign companies a new host of opportunities to establish or 
expand their share of the world’s largest potential consumer market.  My research 
clearly reveals that the Chinese automotive market represents one of the hottest – if not 
the hottest – business niches in the world.  With respect to the three scenarios 
discussed in Section 7.3, I believe that the WTO membership will make a real impact on 
the industry and the second scenario would be most likely to occur.  For an industry that 
                                            
12 My interview with Yongqing Ye of DaimlerChrysler China on December 18, 2002. 
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grew under 50 years of protection, the WTO membership will force it to rethink the 
importance of market competition, which ultimately will promote it into a new stage.  
Although the fragmentation may not disappear anytime soon and small-scale Chinese 
automakers will try to survive, the Chinese automotive industry will eventually rise up to 
the WTO challenge and become an important automotive manufacturing base in the 
world.  China has progressed remarkably quickly from mastering low-tech product 
manufacturing to higher technology-driven product manufacturing. There is no reason to 
believe they would fail to master automotive manufacturing.  The only question is how 
long will it take?  From the view of macro-economic reform, the success of the 
automotive industry largely depends on the extent to which China, as a whole, will 
transform into a market-driven economy and be integrated into the world economy.  
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